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Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings:
Protecting "Liberty-Property"
JOHN MARTINEZ*

When... by a misguided or mistaken operation of the governmental
machine there is a miscarriage of justice and the helpless innocent is
actually convicted, the public conscience is and ought to be revolted
and dismayed. The least the community can do to repair the
irreparable, is to appease the public conscience by making such
restitution as it can by indemnity.'
When a small piece of property is taken by the government to build a
new highway, the owner is constitutionally guaranteed fair market
compensation, even if owed a relatively trivial sum. But when an
innocent person is wrongly convicted by the criminal justice system, he
or she is not guaranteed a dime when the mistake is discovered
afterward, despite the scars of long years of incarceration.!
INTRODUCTION

DNA evidence is now widely used to secure exonerations of people
imprisoned for crimes they did not commit. Exonerees, however,
typically recover nothing for the harm caused by their wrongful
conviction and incarceration. Instead, they are set free to be poor: their
common law claims are defeated by sovereign immunity doctrine,
statutes providing for relief typically erect a network of obstacles to
recovery that most litigants find virtually impenetrable, and their
constitutional civil rights claims shatter against the barriers of
governmental immunity and causation doctrines.
Potential alternative grounds for recovery arise from just
compensation clauses in federal and state constitutions.' Such clauses
* Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah. This Article was
funded in part by the University of Utah College of Law Excellence in Teaching and Research Fund. I
am particularly grateful to my wife Karen Martinez for her insightful comments and suggestions on
this Article. I would also like to thank Ms. Jennifer Butler, Class of 2oo6, for her editorial help.
I. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT-ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 392 (1932).
2. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 13 YALE L.J. 1029, io63 (2004).
3. The Federal Just Compensation Clause provides that "private property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similar just compensation
provisions in state constitutions, prohibit the "taking" of "property" without payment of "just
compensation." See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 ("Private property may be taken or damaged for
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require the claimant to show "property" was "taken" by the government
and that therefore "compensation" is constitutionally compelled.4
The fundamental flaw of just compensation clause arguments as a
form of relief for wrongful convictions to date, however, has been that
they are based on a conception of "property" that focuses on the asset
involved as the property in question. Such "thing-thinking" about
property in the context of wrongful conviction relief treats the person
wrongfully convicted as the "asset" involved. This immediately raises the
moral conundrum of treating people as commodities-as slaves that have
been "taken" by the government. More fundamentally, however, such
"thing-thinking" about property leads to the analytical dead end of
focusing on the asset involved, rather than on the rights of the people
affected.
This Article suggests that we should instead think of wrongful
convictions as arising at the boundary of liberty and property. Wrongful
convictions resulting in incarceration destroy numerous quintessentially
"liberty" interests, including the right to move about freely, to privacy, to
free speech, to security of person, and to the freedom to engage in
personal and professional achievement. A wrongful conviction often
destroys these liberty interests, and this destruction, in turn, causes
devastating economic consequences for those wrongfully convicted.
This Article suggests that destruction of liberty interests by wrongful
convictions causes a taking of "liberty-property" for which a remedy is
constitutionally compelled by state and federal just compensation
clauses. In order to use just compensation clause arguments effectively to
provide compensation for the wrongfully convicted, we must utilize a
conceptualization of property that focuses on rights, not on the asset in
question. Such a relational concept of property makes possible a
consideration of what is really at stake in wrongful conviction settings:
rights, not assets. Compensation, therefore, may be re-envisioned as the
value of the rights of which those wrongfully convicted have been
deprived.
public use only when just compensation ....
");UTAH

CONsT. art. I, § 22 ("Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.").

4. The Author's work in the field of takings includes: JOHN MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS
(2o06) [hereinafter MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS]; John Martinez, A Prudential Theory for
Providing a Forum for Federal Takings Claims, 36 REAL PROP. PROBS. & TR. J. 445 (2ooI); John
Martinez, Reconstructing the Takings Doctrine by Redefining Property and Sovereignty, 16 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 157 (t988); John Martinez, Statutes Enacting Takings Law: Flying in the Face of Uncertainty,
26 URB. LAW. 327 (1994); John Martinez, Taking Time Seriously: The Federal Constitutional Right to
Be Free From "Startling" State Court Overrulings, II HARV. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 297 (I988); see also 3 C.

E. LIsONATI & JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW ch. 16, at I (1987)
SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW]; JOHN MARTINEZ & MICHAEL

DALLAS SANDS, MICHAEL
[hereinafter

E.

3

LIBONATI, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW:

A

TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH (2000) [hereinafter

MARTINEZ & LIBONATI, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW].
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WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

This Article proceeds as follows: Part I critically analyzes the nature
of wrongful convictions and their incidence in the United States. That
analysis reveals that DNA exonerations, by simultaneously overturning a
conviction as well as establishing factual innocence, are only the most
obvious examples of wrongful convictions. There are numerous
additional categories of wrongful convictions, including cases of errors in
criminal procedure, circumstances of factual innocence, and situations
where factual innocence or guilt is indeed unresolved. Part II uses the
civil case of Michael Ray Graham and Albert Burrell, who were
wrongfully convicted and spent thirteen years on death row, to illustrate
the failure of current legal doctrine to provide compensation for
wrongful convictions in the United States. Part III critically examines
existing normative justifications for providing compensation to the
wrongfully convicted and suggests that the loss-spreading dimension of
just compensation jurisprudence provides a better normative foundation
than existing formulations. Part IV then focuses on existing just
compensation clause doctrinal arguments for providing compensation to
the wrongfully convicted and points out their flawed "thing-thinking"
conception of property. Part V explains that wrongful convictions arise at
the boundary between liberty and property, and describes how a
"relational" property construct liberates otherwise flawed doctrinal
constructs to properly focus on rights, rather than assets, in the wrongful
conviction setting. Part VI concludes by illustrating how the relational
property construct allows us to establish the crucial link between liberty
protection and property protection. This, in turn, allows us to implement
the loss-spreading norm via a reconstructed just compensation
jurisprudence. The elements of wrongful conviction claims, as well as the
remedial considerations that should be taken into account in their
implementation, are also examined. Such reconstructed just
compensation jurisprudence ultimately allows us to properly protect the
"liberty-property" of the wrongfully convicted through the provision of
compensation for liberty deprivations.
I.

WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THEIR INCIDENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES

A.

DEFINING "WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS"

The term "wrongful conviction" has two components: (I)
"wrongful" refers to the governmental conduct that caused the
"conviction" result and (2) "conviction" refers to the impact on the
person subjected to the governmental conduct in question. Each of these
terms must be separately defined.
The term "wrongful" has two possible subsets. Substantive

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:515

wrongfulness refers to someone who is factually innocent5 of the offense
for which they were convicted. Procedural wrongfulness refers to
someone who was convicted through tainted procedures, such as denial
of Miranda warnings or prosecutorial concealment of exculpatory
evidence from the defense. Substantive wrongfulness arises when the
government convicts a person who is factually innocent of the crime
involved. 6 "Innocence Projects" throughout the United States are
focused on helping factually innocent people-those who "didn't do
it"-as opposed to those who might have been convicted through a
procedural irregularity.7
Substantively wrongful convictions are almost universally recognized
as proper bases for wrongful conviction compensation claims. Federal
and state wrongful conviction statues are founded on the notion that the
claimant who can demonstrate that he or she truly "didn't do it" is
entitled to compensation. Indeed, almost all of these statutes provide for
recovery only by those who can prove they are factually innocent.
Procedural wrongfulness arises when the government engages in
procedural irregularity resulting in a criminal conviction. Such
procedural irregularities are many and varied. They may arise at the
initial stages of police conduct, such as a police officer's failure to
provide a Miranda warning, police perjury, or the failure to disclose
investigation information to which a defendant is entitled.9 Other
examples of procedural wrongfulness include the use by prosecutors of
unreliable witness testimony,"° false confessions, forensic fraud or
5. The term "factual innocence" is derived from William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence,
70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 385 (1995) ("The search for a genuine consideration of factual innocence in the
criminal process ends with state and federal statutes that are devised to compensate the wrongfully
convicted and imprisoned.").
6. See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, How the PretrialProcess Contributesto Wrongful Convictions,
42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, I124-25 (2005) ("those who did not in fact commit the crime [of which they
were convicted]"). See generally The Innocence Project-About Us, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/9.php (last visited Jan. 1, 2008) ("dedicated to exonerating the innocent").
7. See C. Ronald Huff, What Can We Learn from Other Nations About the Problem of Wrongful
Conviction?, 86 JUDICATURE 91, 92 (2002) ("actually innocent"); Center on Wrongful Convictions,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/ (last visited Jan. I, 2OO8) (focusing on "claims
of actual innocence").
8. A summary of existing statutes and their requirements are set out in the Appendix.
9. See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 6.
to. For example, a federal district court found that the FBI had knowingly used false snitch
testimony to convict innocent defendants, and had continued to conceal the information while the
defendants spent over thirty years in prison, some on death row. Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp.
2d 143, I5I (D. Mass. 2007) ("[G]overnment agents suborned perjury, framed four innocent men,
[and] conspired to keep them in jail for three decades .... "). Since intentional governmental conduct
was involved, the Limone case was brought as a tort claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, not
under a takings theory. Id. at 202 ("Plaintiffs bring six claims against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act ('FTCA'), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 and 2671-268o: malicious prosecution, civil
conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, bystander intentional infliction of emotional
distress, negligent selection, supervision, and retention, and loss of consortium."). Since 1974, the
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quackery, or other prosecutorial misconduct."
Procedural wrongfulness also may arise even when no police or
prosecutorial misconduct or neglect has occurred. Examples include
erroneous eyewitness identification testimony, ineffective assistance of
counsel, and newly discovered evidence which simply was unavailable to

anyone before a conviction became final.'2
For example, Harry Miller was convicted of stealing a woman's
purse at knifepoint in Salt Lake City and spent four and one-half years of
a five-years-to-life sentence in a Utah prison. 3 Subsequently identified
witnesses and hospital records, however, showed that during the time
period when the offense was committed, Mr. Miller was being treated in
Louisiana for a paralyzing stroke he had suffered.' 4 The Utah Court of
Appeals overturned his conviction and granted him a new trial.' 5 The
Utah prosecutors decided not to retry him and he was set free, but
penniless.' 6 There was no police or prosecutorial misconduct or neglect in
Mr. Miller's case. The prosecutors had sufficient evidence to take the
case to trial, a jury convicted him, and he was sent to prison. Mr. Miller
also received adequate representation-defense counsel, appointed by
the State, believed sufficient available evidence existed to establish
reasonable doubt.'7 The fact remains, however, that Mr. Miller suffered
federal government has allowed itself to be sued for certain intentional torts committed by federal
"investigative or law enforcement officers." 28 U.S.C. § 268o(h) (2000). The statute was amended in
1974 to allow suits for assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process and malicious
prosecution. Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat 50; see also Limone v. United States,
336 F. Supp. 2d 18, 29-30 (D. Mass. 2004) (reviewing the history of this 1974 amendment to the
Federal Tort Claims Act). For a discussion of the distinctions between tort claims and constitutional
claims against the federal government, see JOHN MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, supra note 5, § 4:4.
II.See Rob Warden, Illinois Death Penalty Reform: How It Happened, What It Promises, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 382-83 (2005) (causes of convictions in capital exonerations in Illinois);

see also Keith A. Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study
Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333,340 (2002).

The ...errors.., that produce wrongful convictions.., derive not just from what happens
in the courtroom, but from every step in the process-from the initial gathering of evidence,
interviewing of witnesses, and identification of suspects; to the decisions about whom to
investigate, what science and experts to utilize, what evidence the state must or should
disclose to the defense; to the rules governing admissibility of evidence, such as expert
testimony on eyewitness identification and the testimony of jailhouse informants; to the
instructions given to the jury on these matters; to the nature of and applicable standards for
appellate review and the availability of postconviction remedies.
Id.
12. Such instances of procedural wrongfulness are sometimes described as "miscarriages of
justice." Michael Naughton, Redefining Miscarriagesof Justice, a Revived Human-Rights Approach to
Unearth Subjugated Discourses of Wrongful CriminalConviction, 45 BRIT.J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 165, 16667 (2005) (discussing wrongful convictions as "miscarriages of justice," defined as any case
subsequently overturned on appeal, in England and Wales).
13. Stephen Hunt, Wrongful Prosecution?,SALT LAKE TRIS., July 22, 2007, at At, A I.
14. Id.
15. Id.

16. Id.
I7.Id. at Ass.
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harm under circumstances in which his guilt or innocence was never
properly adjudicated.
The question thus becomes whether the State's procedures are
responsible for Mr. Miller's harm. The State appointed his counsel;'"
thus, if the State failed to assure such counsel was properly qualified and
had adequate financial support to mount a defense, then Mr. Miller
could argue that his harm was "caused" by the State's wrongful
procedure.' 9 On the other hand, if he had hired his own counsel, any
conduct by such counsel could not be attributed to the State's procedures
for appointing counsel for indigent defendants. In Mr. Miller's case, the
State appointed his counsel, and it appears that Mr. Miller was
adequately represented. Therefore, we must conclude that the State's
procedures were not responsible for Mr. Miller's harm.
Mr. Miller still might be entitled to relief, however, even though the
State's procedures did not cause his harm. This requires consideration of
the relation among procedures, convictions, and factual innocence or
guilt.
I. Procedures,Convictions, and FactualInnocence or Guilt
Our criminal justice system does not seek truth; it seeks justice."
Justice is driven by considerations such as problem-solving, predictability
and finality." To state the obvious, it is possible for a criminal defendant
to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted while failing
to determine whether the defendant is indeed factually innocent or
factually guilty. It is therefore useful to consider the relationship among
(i) wrongful or non-wrongful procedures, (2) conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt, and (3) factual innocence or guilt.
Wrongful procedures" may result in convictions of the factually
innocent or of the factually guilty. Even non-wrongful procedures may
result in convictions either of the factually innocent or the factually
18. See id. at Ai.

i9. Cf. N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 745 N.Y.S.2d 376,387 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (increase
in appointed attorney compensation ordered because inadequate rates create "an economic
disincentive for lawyers to perform adequate investigations and seek speedy disposition of all cases
despite the particular facts").
20. Cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5,30 (996) ("I wonder what would result if we redefined

our legal system to seek 'problem-solving' as one of its goals rather than 'truth-finding."').
21. Id.; see also Ward v. Turner, 366 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1961) ("In order to justify a [postconviction] release of a convicted person... the evidence of his innocence must be stronger than
would be necessary in the first instance in support of a motion for a new trial, for such special writs are
applied for after the defendant's conviction has been affirmed or denied on appeal, and in a sense they
invade the usual rules for the finality of judgments."); Stephen J. Safranek, The Legal Obligation of
Clients, Lawyers, and Judges to Tell the Truth, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 345,345-46 n.2 (1998).

22. As discussed in the immediately preceding section, "wrongful procedures" may arise either
where there is police or prosecutor misconduct or neglect, or when the State fails to appoint properly
qualified and adequately supported defense counsel.
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guilty. The latter situations arise where there is no police or prosecutorial
neglect or misconduct, and the State otherwise provides proper
procedures such as duly qualified and adequately supported appointed
counsel. For example, in Mr. Miller's case, since there was no police or
prosecutor misconduct or neglect, and if his State-appointed counsel was
qualified and adequately supported, then Mr. Miller cannot establish that
it was the State's wrongful procedures that caused his harm. Thus Mr.
Miller has no remedy based on the State's wrongful procedures.
In order to bring those other possibilities for relief into focus, it is
necessary to clarify the relation between wrongful procedures, conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt, and factual innocence or guilt. First, the
process of conviction beyond a reasonable doubt is simply the vehicle
whereby the government conduct-whether from wrongful procedures
or from non-wrongful procedures-results in the impact on the
defendant of conviction and incarceration.23 Second, although the
criminal justice system has a certain inertia justified by the goal of
preserving a criminal conviction as a final judgment, the fact that a
defendant has been convicted does not determine whether the defendant
is factually innocent or factually guilty. Thus, conviction is independent
of both wrongful or non-wrongful procedures on one hand, and factual
innocence or factual guilt on the other.
2.
Groundsfor Wrongful Conviction Relief
Criminal convictions may result from wrongful or from nonwrongful procedures, and such convictions may punish factually innocent
or factually guilty persons. The matrix is as follows:
(i)

(3)

Wrongful Procedures

Wrongful Procedures

+

+

Factual Innocence

Factual Guilt

(2)

(4)

Non-Wrongful Procedures

Non-Wrongful Procedures

+

+

Factual Innocence

Factual Guilt

Convictions of the factually innocent, in settings (i) and (2), whether
through wrongful or non-wrongful procedures, impose harm resulting
23. Alternatives to incarceration such as probation or community service also might be imposed
which entail harm to defendants. Consideration of the impact of such alternatives, however, is beyond
the scope of this Article. See generally Developments in the Law-Alternatives to Incarceration, i ii
HARV.

L. REv. 1863 (1998).
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from the consequences of conviction. Circumstances of factual
innocence, for example, arise when there is DNA evidence exonerating
the defendant of the offense charged, or where a key witness recants
testimony.'2 In setting (i), if the government can demonstrate that if
proper procedures had been followed, the same (unfortunate)
consequences would have resulted, it might be argued that the
governmental conduct did not cause the harm involved and the claimant
should not recover. Most jurisdictions that have considered whether to
provide compensation to those who can prove they are factually
innocent, however, have implicitly rejected such an argument. 5 The fact
of factual innocence trumps the logic of causation, and substantive
wrongfulness is often compensable in jurisdictions that provide for
compensation
regardless
of procedural
wrongful conviction
wrongfulness. In contrast, convictions of factually guilty persons, whether
through wrongful or through non-wrongful procedures, present different
wrongful conviction remedial questions. In the wrongful procedure
setting (3), suppose a search warrant is for "126 Main Street," but the
police wrongfully search defendant's house on 129 Main Street instead.
Suppose further that the police find a meth lab in the basement at 129
Main Street pursuant to the unlawful search. Assume the circumstances
prove defendant is factually guilty and defendant is duly convicted.
However, if the government can show that if the police had properly
searched the defendant's house, 6 they would have found the meth lab,
then the wrongful procedure did not "cause" the conviction and no
wrongful conviction remedy would be available. The United States
Supreme Court has established a similar principle with respect to § 1983
claims: "In order to recover compensatory damages.., the § 1983
plaintiff must prove not only that the search was unlawful, but that it
caused him actual, compensable injury ....
The Court has emphasized the crucial causal link between
deprivation of procedural rights and the harm suffered in the field of
employment discrimination as well. Thus, an employee may not recover
damages for the failure of an employer to provide a termination hearing
where the employer can prove the emplo Yee would have been fired
anyway if proper procedures had been used.'
24. Cf Julian v. State, 52 P.3 d 1168, 1I70 (Utah 2002) (noting, in a case where the issue was
whether the defendant was entitled to a new trial, that the key witness recanted her trial testimony,
admitting in 1994 that she had lied in the defendant's 1987 trial).
25. A summary of existing statutes and their requirements are set out in the Appendix.
26. For example, suppose the warrant was indeed for "129 Main Street."
27. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n.7 (1994) (emphasis added).
28. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263 (1978) (holding that employee seeking damages for
procedural due process violation must show injuries resulted from denial of due process itself, not
from corresponding justifiable deprivation and allowing only one dollar nominal recovery); see also
Laje v. R. E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 665 F.2d 724,729-30 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that if employer can
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Convictions of the factually guilty through selective prosecution
based on race or vindictive prosecution would be similarly analyzed
under setting (3). Thus, such wrongful procedures would not have
"caused" the convictions if the government can show such convictions
would have occurred even if proper non-racial or non-vindictive
prosecution had been used. Setting (4), by comparison, is relatively
straightforward. Where the claimant indeed committed the offense
charged and was convicted through non-wrongful procedures, no bona
fide wrongful conviction claims can arise.
Further complexities arise when factual innocence or guilt is
unresolved. Since conviction does not by itself establish factual
innocence or guilt, and since wrongful as well as non-wrongful
procedures might lead to convictions, the question becomes whether a
remedy should be provided when innocence or guilt is unresolved. To
take these additional settings into account, our matrix must include a
third column:
(3)

(I)

(5)

Wrongful Procedures

Wrongful Procedures

Wrongful Procedures

+

+

+

Factual Innocence

Factual Guilt

Guilt or Innocence
Unresolved

(4)

(2)

(6)

Non-Wrongful Procedures

Non-Wrongful Procedures

Non-Wrongful Procedures

+

+

+

Factual Innocence

Factual Guilt

Guilt or Innocence
Unresolved

In setting (5), where procedural wrongfulness has caused the
conviction but guilt or innocence is unresolved, it is arguable that
compensation should be provided based on the wrongful procedures
alone. Since it is presumed that criminal defendants are innocent until
proven guilty, a procedural error leading to their conviction leaves the
presumption unrebutted, even if factual innocence has not been
demonstrated. For example, a 2003 Ohio statute provides that
individuals released because they were incarcerated due to "an error in
procedure," as well as those who are judicially determined not to have
committed a crime at all, are allowed to file a claim against the state. 9
And some European governments provide compensation for wrongful
prove proper procedures would have resulted in termination, employee may not recover).
29. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West Supp. 2004).
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convictions that are due to wrongful procedures."
However, in setting (6), where no procedural wrongfulness caused
the conviction-that is, when non-wrongful procedures resuited in a
conviction-and guilt or innocence is unresolved, the problem becomes
one of defining the standard of proof which the convicted person must
meet in order to obtain wrongful conviction civil relief. Mr. Miller's case
is illustrative: assuming no procedural wrongfulness caused his conviction
and consequent harm, and since the prosecutors chose not to retry him,
we must determine what standard of proof he would have to meet in
order to recover in the subsequent civil wrongful conviction action. For
example, a demanding standard would require that he prove factual
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. A less demanding standard would
require he prove factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.
An intermediate standard would require him to show that it was
"substantially unlikely" he committed the offense." Definition of the
appropriate standard of proof, including the myriad complexities of
presumptions, and allocation and shifting of the burdens of production
and persuasion requires further study, but is beyond the scope of this
Article.32
B.

"CONVICTIONS"

DEFINED

Harm caused by administration of the criminal justice system may

30. See, e.g., Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 5(5), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 228 (providing compensation to
anyone who has been unlawfully arrested or detained); Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. T.S. No. I17
(providing compensation to convicts who have been pardoned or who have had convictions
overturned on ground of miscarriage of justice). See generally Stuart Beresford, Comment, Redressing
the Wrongs of the InternationalJustice System: Compensation for Persons Erroneously Detained,
Prosecuted,or Convicted by the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 628 (2002) (examining remedies
available under the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); Anders Bratholm, Compensation of Persons Wrongfully Accused or
Convicted in Norway, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (i961) (examining Norway's strict liability provisions for
compensation for wrongful conviction or accusation); Sheryl Grant, Note, The InternationalCriminal
Court: The Nations of the World Must Not Give in to All of the United States Demands If the CourtIs to
Be a Strong, Independent InternationalOrgan, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 327 (0999) (examining
remedies available under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court).
31. Cf. Julian v. State, 52 P.3d 1168, 1172 (Utah 2002) (holding that post-conviction motion for
new trial based on newly discovered evidence should be evaluated under intermediate burden
requiring showing that the newly discovered evidence "must render a different result substantially
likely at retrial," rather than a minimal burden requiring a showing that newly discovered evidence
renders a different result probable at retrial, or a higher burden requiring a showing that no
reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt).
32. For an excellent discussion of the significant policy considerations involved in defining and
assigning burdens of production and persuasion, see John Sanchez, The Law of Retaliation After
Burlington Northern and Garcetti, 30 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 539 (2007), reviewing public employee
actions for First Amendment work-related speech.
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range over a broad spectrum: from the bruises on an innocent bystander
who was ordered to "get down" and then had his ankle, knee and back
stepped on when police officers executed a search warrant at a garage,33
to the years spent on death row by the person subsequently exonerated
based on DNA evidence,34 and everything in between. Cases in between
might include the situation where police officers fire a dozen tear gas
canisters into a convenience store, where a fleeing felony suspect is
hiding, and cause over $275,000 in damage.35 Another example might be
where a landfill company which applied for a landfill use permit is
investigated for ties with organized crime, and its business is seriously
harmed when the report of the investigation is released to the press even
though the company is found to be "clean" of any mob ties. 6 A third
example might be the case of a Cypriot who becomes a director of a
Libyan-controlled company and is prohibited from exercising valuable
stock options by a Reagan-era Executive Order against Libyansponsored terrorism.37 In each of these cases, across a broad spectrum, a
person has been wrongfully deprived of the liberty to do what they
otherwise would have been free to do but for the wrongful governmental
conduct.
Most cases in just compensation jurisprudence have arisen outside
the criminal justice setting. Governmental land use regulation, and more
specifically, the exercise of the police power to zone, have given rise to
most takings cases."s Just compensation jurisprudence, however, is far
broader than the field of land use regulation. For example, in Dames &
Moore v. Regan, the plaintiff complained that the freezing of Iranian
33. See, e.g., Paul v. City of Rochester, 452 F. Supp. 2d 223, 225-26, 229 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding
police conduct reasonable as a matter of law on summary judgment motion where Plaintiff was placed
in handcuffs and made to lay face down on the ground for about thirty to forty-five minutes while
officers searched the garage and arrested the suspect and plaintiff was released within an hour).
34. These situations of egregious harm are discussed below in Part II.
35. Compare Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1995) (denying recovery on
grounds that benefit was conferred and that emergency existed), with Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins.
Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. i99i) (holding owner in similar circumstances entitled to compensation).

See generally JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS,
AND DEFENSES § 7.07[3] (4th ed. 2006) (discussing state court decisions both ways in these types of
scenarios).
36. See WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 376 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying recovery
because no "property right" in business reputation). Contra Sorrano's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d
1310 (9th Cir. I989) (involving situation where letters describing investigation were sent to individual
customers advising them not to deal with claimant).
37. See Paradissiotis v. United States, 304 F.3d 1271, 1272-73 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that

claimant received stock options in 1985, Executive Order was issued in 1986, and claimant became a
director in 1986; therefore causing his own problem).
38. The zoning power's foundation in governmental authority to regulate for the public health,
safety, welfare and morals, otherwise collectively known as the police power, is well-established. Vill.
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 390 (1926). See generally 3 SANDS, LIBoNATI &
MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 4, §§ 16.5o-16.53 (discussing takings in the land
development regulation setting).
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assets by the President under the power over foreign affairs improperly
affected the plaintiff's property.39 In Summa Corp. v. California,the state
asserted a "public trust" easement under state constitutional authority
over plaintiff's private land.4" In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the United
States attempted to force the plaintiff to allow public access to plaintiff's
private marina under the federal commerce power to regulate navigable
waters.' Another example involved a cigarette vending company
prohibited from continuing to operate its vending machines by a new
town ordinance.42 Even when the government condemns land, the
landowner may make a claim for additional just compensation.43
In both the criminal justice and civil settings, a person's liberty is
restricted, preventing them from doing what they otherwise would like to
do, but for the governmental conduct. Thus, it is arguable that a remedy
should be provided for harm resulting from governmental conduct along
the criminal justice spectrum-from being temporarily detained by
police, to spending time on death row. Differences in the degree of harm
may implicate different remedial concerns.
This Article, however, is limited to the wrongful conviction that
results in incarceration, whether in informal custody, in jail, or in prison.'
In those settings, the impact on the wrongfully convicted person-the
deprivation of liberty and opportunity loss-is egregious.
C.

INCIDENCE OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Since there is no general agreement on what counts as "wrongful" or
as a "conviction," there are no reliable statistics on the incidence of
wrongful convictions in the United States. 45 Reported statistics vary
39. 453 U.S. 654,666-67 (198i).
40. 466 U.S. 198, 200 (1984).
41. 444 U.S. 64, i68 (i979).
42. Gen. Food Vending Inc. v. Town of Westfield, 672 A.2d 760, 762, 765-66 (N.J. 1995) (denying
recovery because the value of the vending machines was diminished, not destroyed, because cigarette
sales is a highly regulated industry, and because the machines were not physically appropriated, but
merely restricted in their use).
43. See 3 SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 5, § 21.26 (inverse
condemnation). For a partial list of other settings that give rise to just compensation claims, see 4 C.
DALLAS SANDS, MICHAEL E. LIBONATI & JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 27.11 (2000)

[hereinafter 4

SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW]

(liabilities and immunities by

function); § 27.20 (police activities); § 27.2t (correctional activities); § 27.22 (fire protection,
emergency rescue, and transportation); § 27.23 (regulatory and licensing activities), § 27.24 (service
provision activities), § 27.25 (public facilities and improvements), § 27.26 (parks and recreational
activities).
44. For consideration of takings claims in civil settings, see generally JOHN MARTINEZ,
GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, supra note 4.
45. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerationsin the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CIMINOLOGY 523, 525 (2005) ("There is no national registry of exonerations, or any simple

way to tell from official records which dismissals, pardons, etc., are based on innocence. As a result, we
learned about many of the cases in our database from media reports. But the media inevitably miss
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depending on what definitions are used and the degree to which data is
available in light of those definitions. For example, one study defined
exoneration as "an official act declaring a defendant not guilty of a crime
for which he or she had previously been convicted. ' ' 46 That study found
340 exonerations in the United States from 1989 through 2003. 4 ' These
consisted of
327 men and 13 women; i44 of them were cleared by DNA evidence,
196 by other means. With a handful of exceptions, they had been in

prison for years. More than half had served terms of ten years or more;
8o% had been imprisoned for at least five years. As a group, they had
spent more than 3400 years in prison for crimes for which they should
never have been convicted-an average of more than ten years each.f
The Cardozo Law School Innocence Project, by comparison, focuses
on exonerations based on DNA evidence.49 As of July 5, 2007, the
Innocence Project website reports that "[t]here have
been 204 post5°
conviction DNA exonerations in the United States.
The Northwestern Law School Center on Wrongful Convictions
(CWC) takes a third approach, defining its mission as combating
"wrongful convictions and other serious miscarriages of justice."'" The
Center "uses the term 'wrongful conviction' and 'exoneration'
synonymously to describe any case in which a defendant was convicted of
a crime and later restored to the status of legal innocence."5 The Center
acknowledges that "[w]hile there is an obvious difference between legal
innocence and actual innocence ... [t]he cases included on the CWC list
are those... in which there is evidence of actual innocence."53 The
CWC's statistics reach more broadly than those reported by the Cardozo
Law School Innocence Project: "In addition to cases in which the
defendant has been restored to legal innocence, the CWC list includes
cases in which appellate courts ordered new trials and, in spite of
compelling evidence of actual innocence, the defendant entered a plea of

some cases-and we, no doubt, have missed some cases that were reported.").
46. Id. at 524.
47. Id. at 523-24.
48. Id.
49. The Innocence Project, supra note 7 ("dedicated to exonerating the innocent through postconviction DNA testing").
5o . The Innocence Project, Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/35i.php (last visited Jan. 1, 2008). As of February I6, 2005, the Innocence Project
had reported 174 such exonerations. See Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful Conviction:
TheoreticalImplications and PracticalSolutions, 5i VILL. L. REv. 337, 337 n.s (2006).

5i. Center on Wrongful Convictions, http://www.law.northwestem.edu/wrongfulconvictions/ (last
visited Jan. I, 2008).
52. Center on Wrongful Convictions, Criteria for Cases Listed as Exonerations, http://www.law.
northwestem.edu/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/ (last visited Jan. I, 2008).
53. Id.
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guilty in order to secure prompt release." 4 The CWC has statistics for
most states; 5 for Illinois, alone, where the CWC is based, it reported ioi
exonerations."
Although there are no consistent statistics of wrongful convictions in
the United States, because the studies use differing definitions of
wrongful convictions, the numbers evidence a real problem in the
criminal justice system. Since the stakes are so high when incarceration is
involved, the problem demands our concern and attention.

II.

CURRENT STATUS OF LEGAL DOCTRINE FOR PROVIDING

COMPENSATION FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: THE CASE OF MICHAEL
RAY GRAHAM, JR. AND ALBERT BURRELL

Michael Ray Graham, Jr., and Albert Burrell were sentenced to
death for the murder of an elderly couple. 7 On December 28, 2000, after
they had spent more than thirteen years on death row, the Louisiana
Attorney General dismissed all charges against them because there was a
"'total lack of credible evidence' linking either man to the crime."" Upon
release, each man was given ten dollars and a denim jacket, just like
every other inmate released from prison in Louisiana, regardless whether
they had been exonerated, like Graham and Burrell, or whether they had
simply finished serving their time. 9
On December 26, 2001, Graham and Burrell filed a civil complaint
seeking recovery personally against the prosecutors, the sheriffs and
deputy sheriffs, and a laboratory investigator.6 The complaint also
54. Id.
55. Center on Wrongful Convictions, The Exonerated: Exonerations in All States, http://www.
law.northwestem.edu/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/uslndex.html (last visited Jan. I, 2008).
56. Center on Wrongful Convictions, Illinois Wrongful Convictions, http://www.law.northwestem
.edu/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/illndex.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2008).
57. Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REv. 61, 82 n.8o (2003); see also Alberto
B. Lopez, $to and a Denim Jacket? A Model Statute for Compensatingthe Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA.
L. REV. 665, 665-69 (2002) (discussing further Michael Ray Graham, Jr.'s conviction and subsequent
exoneration); Steven M. Pincus, "It's Good to Be Free" An Essay About the Exoneration of Albert
Burrell, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 27, 32 n.8 (2001) (discussing exoneration of Albert Burrell, who was
represented by Mr. Pincus and who had been convicted and sentenced to death along with Michael
Ray Graham, Jr.).
58. Complaint at 2, Burrell v. Adkins, No. 3 :01CV26 7 9 (W.D. La. filed Dec. 26, 200i).
59. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:866 (2005); see also 1988 La. Acts 377, § I (amending statute in 1988
and increasing the amount to twenty dollars, but making no mention of a denim jacket); Brandon L.
Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error,and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 35, 48 &
n.6o (2005) (assisting in the representation of Mr. Graham in his subsequent civil case was Mr.
Garrett). Mr. Graham could not even afford to get back home to Virginia; his lawyers bought him the
$127 Greyhound bus ticket so he could get home. Lopez, supra note 57, at 669-70 n.25 ("[N]oting
denim jacket was five sizes too large." (citing Protectingthe Innocent.- Ensuring Competent Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, Io7th Cong. (2001) (statement
of Michael Graham))).
6o. Complaint, supra note 58, at 5-7.
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sought recovery against the North Louisiana Criminalistics Laboratory
and against the various insurance companies that insured the
defendants. 6' Recovery was also sought against the governmental entities
involved. 62 The complaint sought $25,000,000
in compensatory damages
63
and $50,000,000 in punitive damages.
The fundamental contention by Graham and Burrell was that
defendants in this action coerced perjured testimony, fabricated
evidence, ignored and later suppressed exculpatory evidence, and filed
false affidavits of probable cause with the court, all in an effort to
secure indictments and ultimately death sentences against two innocent
men. According to a sworn affidavit from defendant/appellant Dan
Grady, the decision to so proceed against plaintiffs was made entirely
for political reasons-the then Union Parish District Attorney,
defendant/appellant Tommy Adkins, directed Grady to seek an
indictment over Grady's objections because Adkins did not want to
embarrass
the Union Parish Sheriff, defendant Kenneth Larry
64
Averitt.
The complaint alleged claims under the Louisiana and federal
constitutions for violation of the right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure, to equal protection of the law, to due process of law,
to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel, to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment, and for violation of additional unenumerated rights
under the state constitution. 6' The complaint also alleged common law
claims of infliction of emotional distress, 66 malicious prosecution," false
arrest,6 and wrongful conviction and imprisonment. 69 The last count of
the complaint also alleged a direct action claim against the defendants'
insurance carriers pursuant to Louisiana statute." The claims seeking
personal recovery against the prosecutors individually were dismissed on
the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity.' The local Parish entity
defendants remain in the case.72 As of May 23, 2007, the federal district
61. Id. at 7-8.
62. Id. at 5-8 (naming as entity defendants the District Attorney and Sheriff Offices of Lincoln
and Union Parishes of Louisiana, as well as the State of Louisiana).
63. Id. at 71-72.
64. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees at 4, Burrell v. Adkins, 94 F. App'x 232 (5th Cir. 2004) (No. 0330487).

Complaint, supra note 58, at 66 (summarizing constitutional claims).
Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 69.
70. Id. at 70-71.
71. Burrell v. Adkins, 94 F. App'x 232, 232-33 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding dismissal of all claims
against defendant prosecutors individually, reversing trial court's retention of one claim against
defendant Grady).
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

72.
Messrs. Grady, Adkins and Levy filed Motions to Dismiss, and as a result, the action against

Grady and Adkins individually has been dismissed, and a final judgment has been entered
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court judge referred the matter to a magistrate for consideration of
various motions by the parties.73
After six years of litigation, the outlook for recovery of
compensation by Graham and Burrell is bleak. Most claimants who seek
compensation for the harm caused by wrongful convictions recover
nothing.74 One writer has characterized the effort to obtain compensation
for the harm caused by wrongful convictions as "a lottery or a popularity
contest."75
In theory, there is a panoply of claims available to a wrongfully
convicted person. 6 But for various reasons, claims against government
as to them.... As against the District Attorney defendants, there remains an alleged socalled "Official Capacity" claim against former District Attorney Adkins and his successor,
District Attorney Robert Levy.
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and for Summary Judgment;
Alternatively Partial Summary Judgment; Alternatively for Dismissal Due to Failure to Respond to
Discovery, Filed on Behalf of Former District Attorney Tommy Adkins and District Attorney Robert
Levy at 6, Burrell v. Adkins, No. oi-2679-M (W.D. La. Nov. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment].
73. Order of Reference, Burrell v. Adkins, No. oI-2679-M (May 23, 2007) (referring for
consideration of various defendants' motions for summary judgment, for judgment on the pleadings,
and to strike plaintiff's expert report).
74. See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails:Indemnificationfor Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CH.
L. SCH. ROUNOTABLE 73, 92 (1999) ("[N]either traditional fault-based tort actions nor civil rights

statutes provide a remedy [for the wrongfully convicted]."); Lopez, supra note 57, at 673 (2002)
(pointing out that "only 37% of wrongfully convicted persons actually receive compensation" (citing
BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE

WRONGLY CONVICTED 230 (2000))); Evan J. Mandery, Commentary, Efficiency Considerations of
Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 41 CRIM. LAW BULL. 287, 292 (2005) ("[T]he statistical

likelihood of recovering on a valid claim ... appears to be minimal."). See generally Shawn Armbrust,
Note, When Money Isn't Enough: The Case for Holistic Compensationof the Wrongfully Convicted, 41
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157 (2004) (suggesting a holistic approach to compensate wrongfully convicted
claimants for actual harms suffered); Natasha L. Brooks, Comment, Texas, Step Up to the Plate and
Compensate: Face to Face with Joyce Ann Brown, Wrongfully Convicted Never to Receive
Compensation, 4 SCHOLAR 45, 50-57, 76-79 (2001) (examining problems faced by the wrongfully

convicted in their largely unsuccessful efforts to obtain compensation and suggesting changes to Texas
wrongful conviction compensation statute, TEx. Clv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001 (Vernon
1997), which was rewritten in 2001, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001 (Vernon 2001), as
amended by Act of June 15, 2001, ch. 1488, § 103.OOI, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 5280-82); Christine L.

Zaremski, Comment, The Compensation of Erroneously Convicted Individuals in Pennsylvania, 43
DuQ. L. REV. 429 (2005) (evaluating critically the relative absence of recovery for wrongful conviction
harm in Pennsylvania). For discussions on international remedies for wrongful convictions see Stuart
Beresford, Comment, Redressing the Wrongs of the InternationalJustice System: Compensation for
Persons Erroneously Detained, Prosecuted,or Convicted by the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
628, 632-33 (2002) (examining remedies available under the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), and Grant, supra note 30.
75. Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to Compensate Individuals
Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated,52 DRAKE L. REV. 703, 708 (2004).

76. The possible claims may be viewed in terms of the following organizational structure:
I. State-Level Defendants
A. Entity State-Level Defendants
I. State Law Claims
a. Common Law
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entities and their employees are unlikely to succeed. First, the elements
of the claims themselves may pose substantial obstacles to recovery. For
example, a claim for malicious prosecution may give rise to recovery of
general damages, as well as to compensation for any arrest or
imprisonment, including damages for discomfort or injury to health, loss
of time and deprivation of society." The elements of a claim for
malicious prosecution, however, are formidable: a plaintiff must prove
(i) the individual was prosecuted without probable cause; (2) the
prosecution occurred with malice, or recklessness to the lack of probable
cause; and (3) the prosecution ultimately terminated in favor of the
accused."8 Such claims are therefore typically unsuccessful because police
can usually credibly testify that they had probable cause.79
Similarly, in order to successfully bring a § 1983 claim against a local
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional

2.Federal Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
B. Individual State-Level Defendants
i. State Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
2. Federal Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
II. Local Government-Level Defendants
A. Entity Local Government-Level Defendants
i. State Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
2. Federal Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
B. Individual Local Government-Level Defendants
i. State Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
2. Federal Law Claims
a. Common Law
b. Statutory
c. Constitutional
77. W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 870 (5th ed. 1984).
78. Id. at 871.
79. See Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error,and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law,
2005 Wis. L. REV. 35, 50-51 (2005) (discussing this critical weakness of the claim).
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government or government official for wrongful conviction resulting
from a violation of a federal right, the claimant must show that the
conviction "has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal,. . . or called into question by a
''
federal court's issuance of a writ
8' of habeas corpus. .. Such claims are
almost universally unsuccessful.
Second, the formidable obstacle of governmental sovereign
immunity must be overcome, either by governmental waiver or because
it is overridden by constitutional commands2 Indeed, the claims by
Graham and Burrell against the individual prosecutors in their personal
capacities were dismissed on the grounds of absolute prosecutorial
immunity.
Third, claims against governmental defendants individually in their
personal capacities usually fail to meet the high standards of proof
required under state and federal law, which demand that claimants prove
the defendants acted intentionally or recklessly; that defendants acted
outside the scope of their employment; or that defendants acted while
under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 83 Thus, in the Graham-Burrell
case, the defendants' motion for summary judgment and for judgment on
the pleadings targeted this dimension of the plaintiffs' burden of proof.84
Fourth, additional hurdles stand in the path of recovery against the
deep pockets of the governmental-entity defendants in these settings. For
claims under state law, the claimant must demonstrate that the

8o. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) ("We hold that, in order to recover damages
for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that
the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.").
81. See Garrett, supra note 79, at 39 (discussing this stacking of the odds against recovery by those
wrongfully convicted as the "larger project" yet to be developed).
82. See MARTINEZ & LIBONATI, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 4, at 179-82
(2ooo) (discussing the principle of sovereign immunity under state law); MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT

TAKINGS, supra note 5, at pt. III, ch. 14 (discussing sovereign immunity and takings law, including state,
local and federal defendants). For an extended discussion of the principle of sovereign immunity, see
John Martinez, Hurry Up and Wait: Negative Statutes of Limitation in the Government Tort Liability
Setting, 19 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 259, 266-84 (2005).
83. See MARTINEZ & LIBONATI, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 4, at 204-09
(explaining that state or local government defendant must be shown to have violated the applicable

standard of care, whether through negligence, recklessness or intentional conduct); 4 SANDS, LIBONATI
& MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 43, at § 27:14 (standard of care under state law),
§ 27:I5 (duty and standard of care under § 1983), § 27:21 (entity and individual governmental
employee liability arising from correctional activities).
84. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 72, at It
("Here we are, almost 20 years after the plaintiffs were indicted, tried and convicted, second-guessing
the motives and actions of the prosecution.").
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governmental employee was acting within the scope of employment.5
For federal law claims, the claimant must demonstrate that the
governmental employee was implementing a "custom or policy" of the
governmental entity.86 In the Graham-Burrell case, the defendants'
motions for summary judgment and for judgment on the pleadings also
targeted this aspect of the plaintiffs' burden."
Most scholars who have examined the problem of providing
compensation for the wrongfully convicted have suggested legislative
solutions for wrongful-conviction claimants such as Graham and Burrell,
but the same scholars have uniformly criticized legislative efforts as
failures because they impose so many procedural and substantive hurdles
to recovery that most wrongfully convicted people are denied
compensation."' The same is true of the federal wrongful conviction
85. See 4 SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 43, at § 27:17
(vicarious liability- respondeat superior).
86. The "custom or policy" requirement derives from 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any
State or Territory or District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2OOO); see 4 SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 43,

§ 27:09 (42 U.S.C. § 1983: entity liability); MARTINEZ & LIrBONATI, supra note 82, at 253-64 (2000)
(claims against local-level entity defendants -the "custom or policy" requirement).
87. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 72, at 25
("It is obvious as a matter of law that no allegation of the plaintiffs' complaint and no evidence
adduced by the plaintiffs supports a pattern of violations by Mr. Adkins' office, such that the adequacy
of his training of the assistant district attorneys such as Mr. Grady was obviously likely to result in a
constitutional violation.").
88. See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, supra note 75, at 707 ("With this Article, I hope to motivate state
legislators to enact responsible, practical compensation statutes ....
");Adele Bernhard, supra note 74,
at 92 (examining statutory compensation schemes); Lopez, supra note 57, at 704-21 (suggesting
provisions for a model statute); see also Armbrust supra note 74, at 181; Brooks, supra note 74, at 5057, 76-79; Christine L. Zaremski, supra note 74, at 452-53. See generally Ackerman, supra note 2, at
IO63-64 n.82.
Only four of these jurisdictions-the District of Columbia, New York, Tennessee, and West
Virginia-impose no statutory ceiling on compensation. D.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-1221 to I1225 (i98i); N.Y. Jud. Ct. Acts Law §8-b (McKinney 1989); Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-IO8(7)
(I999); W. Va. Code Ann. § 14-2-13a (Michie 2000). The other jurisdictions providing relief
are: Alabama, Ala. Code §§ 29-2-150 to -165 (2003) (providing $50,000 for each year of
incarceration, prorated for periods of less than a year, plus a discretionary amount that the
committee in charge of compensation decisions may request from the state legislature);
California, Cal. Penal Code §§ 4900-4906 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004) (providing $soo per
day, not included in gross income for the purposes of state income taxation); Illinois, 705 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 505/8(c) (1999) (providing "for imprisonment of 5 years or less, not more than
$15,ooo; for imprisonment of 14 years or less but over 5 years, not more than $30,000; for
imprisonment of over 14 years, not more than $35,000" plus cost-of-living adjustments);
Iowa, Iowa Code Ann. § 663A.i (West 1998) (granting attorneys' fees and court costs,
liquidated damages up to $50 per day of incarceration, and up to $25,000 per year of lost
income directly related to conviction and imprisonment); Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14,
§§ 8241-8242 (West 2003) (allocating up to $300,ooo for damages and costs, which may not
include punitive damages); Maryland, Md. Code Ann.. State Fin. & Proc. § 1o-5o (West,
WESTLAW through 2003 Reg. Sess.) (providing actual damages due to confinement plus a
reasonable sum for counseling); New Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 54-B:14 (1997 &
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compensation statute, 89 which has proved largely ineffectual and has been
roundly criticized.'
III.

NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS FOR PROVIDING COMPENSATION TO THOSE
WRONGFULLY CONVICTED

Given that wrongful convictions inevitably will occur, and since
existing legal doctrine does not provide compensation, it is necessary to
critically examine the normative justifications for providing
compensation. This section proposes a loss-spreading normative
foundation for providing compensation to the wrongfully convicted and
suggests that just compensation jurisprudence can be used to implement
that normative justification.
Some have argued that there are utilitarian justifications for
providing compensation for wrongful convictions. One such argument is
based on the "deterrence" rationale: compensation deters governmental
conduct that results in wrongful convictions.' This assumes that wrongful
convictions are the product of intentional, reckless, or negligent
behavior, which can be prevented through deterrence. Moreover, it
overlooks that even behavior that is not intentional, reckless, or
negligent also may result in wrongful convictions. For example, a jury
Supp. 2003) (providing $20,ooo); New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:4C-1 to :4 C-6 (West
2001) (granting the greater of twice the claimant's income in the year prior to his
incarceration or $20,000 for each year of imprisonment); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 148-82 to -84 (2003) (authorizing payments of $20,000 per year, not to exceed $500,000);
Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2743.48 (Anderson Supp. 2002) (providing $40,330 per year
of incarceration plus court costs, attorneys' fees, and lost wages); Texas, Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. §§ 103.052, I03.IO5 (Vernon Supp. 2004) (stating that an award
determined by a court may not exceed $5oo,ooo, and if the award is determined by the state
comptroller, it is $25,000 per year if the detention is for less than twenty years, and $5o0,o0o
if twenty or more years); and Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 775.05 (West 2001) (awarding
$5000 per year up to $25,ooo, although the claims board may petition the legislature for
additional compensation). These state programs impose other stringent requirements
before recovery, sometimes making it an entirely discretionary matter.
Id. For a discussion of the international remedies, see Beresford, supra note 74 (examining remedies
available under the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); Grant, supra note 74. For a compilation of state wrongful-conviction
statutes and their requirements, see the Appendix.
89. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 (2000).
90. See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 57, at 672-73 (pointing out that requirements that claimant prove
he is not guilty or has been pardoned, and that he did not commit the offense charged, as well as the
$5,000 cap on recovery, make the statute practically useless); see also Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1996, 42 U.S.C. § 997e(e) (2000) (restricting ability of prisoners to proceed in forma pauperis in
federal courts and also curtailing their right to claim damages for psychological injury without
accompanying physical injury); Laufer, supra note 5, at 387 ("[Tlhe federal compensation statute
allows for the recovery of a very small award of damages. Even so, meeting the statutory requirements
for recovery is difficult, indeed, and few petitioners are successful."); James E. Robertson,
Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A "Not Exactly," Equal Protection
Analysis, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 105, Io6-o7 (2000) (arguing that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1996 unconstitutionally deprives prisoners of equal protection).
91. See Howard S. Master, Note, Revisiting the Takings-Based Argument for Compensating the
Wrongfully Convicted,6o N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 97, IO-1i (2004).
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may have been provided with all the evidence available at the time of
trial and convicted the defendant. Subsequently available DNA testing of
evidence might exonerate the defendant. There was no intentional,
reckless or negligent behavior that led to the conviction. Since DNA
science was not available at the time, the wrongful conviction could not
possibly have been prevented through deterrence.
A second utilitarian argument is the "social insurance" rationale:
society should provide compensation in order to spread the risk of
wrongful convictions among taxpayers as a whole, in the same manner as
workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, or other forms of
social insurance.92 The problem, however, is that no "wrongfullyconvicted compensation system" has evolved. This is probably because it
is almost unimaginable for legislatures or other policy makers to
conceive of the wrongfully-convicted defendant in the same manner as
those who have been injured in the workplace or who have lost their jobs
through no fault of their own.93
The reality is that we have an imperfect system of criminal justice in
which we try our best to be right most of the time, but in which people
will inevitably be wrongfully convicted, no matter how hard we try to
avoid it.94 Wrongful convictions are thus similar to the idea of maximum
employment, which assumes-and perhaps seeks to maintain-about 6%
unemployment, because full employment is simply beyond our reach.95
Indeed, full employment may be undesirable because unemployment
provides some "play" in the labor market that accounts for unemployed
people who are looking for different or better jobs. 6 Unemployment also

92. See id. at 11I-12 (discussing the analogy between wrongful convictions and social insurance
programs).
93. Those who advocate for benefits for workers who lose their jobs through no fault of their own
are referred to as "luck-egalitarians." Nir Eyal, EgalitarianJustice and Innocent Choice, 2 J. ETHICS &
Soc. PHIL. 1, 1 (2007) (noting no groundswell of such "luck-egalitarians" among legislatures or other
policymakers advocating for benefits for the wrongfully convicted has arisen).
94. The imperfection of our criminal justice system is well accepted as dogma. See, e.g., Bernhard,
supra note 74 ("[I]nnocent people have been and will continue to be, unjustly convicted, as an
unfortunate but inevitable consequence of the routine operation of the criminal justice system .... ");
Mandery, supra note 74, at 289 ("The proposition that innocent people are convicted in the United
States is not especially controversial.").
95. See Lucy A. Williams & Margaret Y.K. Woo. The "Worthy" Unemployed: Societal
Stratification and Unemployment Insurance Programs in China and the United States, 33 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 495-96 & n.201 (995) (discussing the concepts of "maximum employment" as
distinguished from "full employment," and noting that "the establishment and development of
unemployment insurance was an alternative to policies which might have realized full employment").
96. See Amy L. Wax, Something for Nothing: Liberal Justice and Welfare Work Requirements, 52
EMORY L.J. 1, 21 (2003) ("Although economists disagree about how much observed unemployment is
'behavioral' rather than 'structural,' few believe that joblessness could be pushed to zero."); see also
Philip Harvey, Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and Social Rights
Seriously, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 363, 451-55 (2002) (discussing "right to work" as method for
addressing structural unemployment).
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may avoid inflation by depressing wages. 7 We accommodate concerns
about worker justice through the mechanism of unemployment insurance
benefits. The same might be said of workers' compensation. We assume
that no matter how hard we try to make the workplace completely safe,
injuries will happen. Indeed, making the workplace absolutely safe may
be undesirable because the costs of doing so would lead to exorbitant
prices for goods and services. We therefore accommodate concerns
98
about worker justice through the mechanism of workers' compensation.
Similarly, we accept that a certain proportion of criminal convictions
will be "wrongful." This might be described as a utilitarian explanation
which accepts that the operation of our criminal justice system simply
tries to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number, and that by
definition that means someone will be harmed even by the optimal
operation of the system. 99 And, just like the 6% unemployment intrinsic
to maintaining maximum employment rather than full employment,
wrongful convictions benefit our society by allowing us to have a
working-albeit imperfect-criminal justice system." In that light, the
search for a criminal justice system in which no wrongful convictions
occur is a misguided quest for the Perfect, and the enemy of the Good.' °
97. Williams & Woo, supra note 95, 495-96 ("This choice lives on today, enshrined in Federal
Reserve Board monetary policy and United States government's fiscal policy that declares some
baseline unemployment rate (currently 6%) to be 'full employment,' and holds that attempting to
lower unemployment beyond this point will trigger uncontrolled inflation.").
98. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, supra note I, at 390 ("The workmen's compensation acts are
perhaps the clearest illustration of this broad change in legal principle, which now applies to many
cases in which any member of a large social group is subjected to the danger of recurring accident and
where a more equitable distribution of the loss seems mandatory."); Paul J. Otterstedt, A Natural
Rights Approach to Regulatory Takings, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 25, 88 (2002) ("A well-crafted worker's
compensation law would probably... [seek] to duplicate results acceptable under the natural law in a
more efficient manner than is possible with individual lawsuits."); see also Eyal, supra note 93, at I
("[L]uck-egalitarians acknowledge the potential [in]justice of inequalities that result from ....
disadvantages that ... result only from un-free choices, such as genetic disease and structural
unemployment.")
99. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 2-3

(J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Methuen 1982) (1789) (greatest good for the greatest number).
Ioo. See generally James W. Hubbell, Retaliatory Discharge and the Economics of Deterrence, 6o
U. COLO. L. REV. 91, io8 (1989) ("The existence of error inevitably leads to trade-offs among the
various goals of a legal system: overzealous enforcement of laws will result in the punishment of some
innocent as well as guilty persons; too little enforcement will permit too many offenses to go
unremedied; and, at some point, a commitment to improving an inherently imperfect justice system
will consume an inordinate amount of resources while doing little to keep the innocent from being
punished or to prevent wrongdoers from violating laws.").
Ioi. See Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Com'rs v. F.C.C., 737 F.2d io95, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("The Commission's work fell short of the ideal at several turns, but our review does not and cannot
require perfection." (citing VOLTAIRE, DICTIONNAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE (Dramatic Art 1794) ("'Le mieux
est l'ennemi du bien'-the best is the enemy of the good"'))); see also F. Scott Kieff, IP Transactions:
On the Theory & Practice of Commercializing Innovation, 42 Hous. L. REV. 727, 731 n.9 (2005) (citing
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 716 (Angela Partington ed., 4 th ed. 1996) (translating the
saying "le mieux est l'ennemi du bien" as meaning "[tlhe best is the enemy of the good" and

February 2008]

WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

Even if complete avoidance of wrongful convictions were possible,' it
would be prohibitively expensive. We therefore accept a criminal justice
system of limited false positives."

The fundamental problem with the conventional approach of
treating wrongful convictions as "failures" of the criminal justice system,
however, is that it leaves wrongfully convicted people free but
uncompensated for the harm they have suffered. 4 There is no "social
safety net," as with workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, or
other forms of social insurance programs. Instead, even though we
assume harm to wrongfully convicted individuals will occur, we
nevertheless presume that freedom is sufficient recompense. But
freedom alone is not enough for the person who has been chewed up by
the criminal justice system and then spit out as wrongfully convicted,
lacking compensation for the harm suffered.
If we instead accept that wrongful convictions are endemic to our
criminal justice system, the task then becomes one of devising a system
which provides compensation to those who will suffer from the inevitable
wrongful convictions." Such a system would redistribute the cost from
the individual to the society as a whole, as the cost of having an
admittedly less-than-perfect criminal justice system. I" 6 As it happens,
such loss-spreading is the fundamental objective of just compensation
attributing the saying to VOLTAIRE, DICTIONNAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE (1770))).
i02. In the film MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox & Dreamworks Pictures 2002), three
young people ("precogs") have the ability to see what will happen in the future, so crimes can be
prevented by incarcerating only those who would have committed the crimes. The movie was based on
PHILIP K. DICK, THE MINORITY REPORT AND OTHER CLASSIC STORIES (2003). See generally Cynthia D.

Bond, Law as Cinematic Apparatus: Image, Textuality, and Representational Anxiety in Spielberg's

Minority Report, 37 CUMB. L. REV. 25 (2006). Our criminal justice system, unfortunately, lacks the
ability to convict only those who are factually guilty.
103. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and
Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 207, 224 (2003) ("The goal is not
zero false negatives [and positives] but the best balance of the two types of errors that we can
achieve.").
104. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Entin, Being the Government Means (Almost) Never Having to Say
You're Sorry: The Sam Sheppard Case and the Meaning of Wrongful Imprisonment, 38 AKRON L. REV.
139, 141-53 (2005) (discussing JACK P. DESARIO & WILLIAM D. MASON, DR. SAM SHEPPARD ON TRIAL:
THE PROSECUTORS AND THE MARILYN SHEPPARD MURDER (2003)). "Compensation for wrongful

imprisonment . . . recognizes that society has perpetrated an injustice on an individual who was
incarcerated in violation of applicable legal standards." Id. at 173.
1O5. For a similar conclusion, see Zaremski, supra note 74, at 431:
Two main theories have emerged to justify the notion of compensation for erroneously
imprisoned individuals, namely: (s) a theory following the rationale of 'eminent domain,'
and (2) a theory following the rationale of "strict liability." The underlying basis for both of
these theories is that "erroneous confinements are costs of operation to be borne by the
system," since "the prosecution of a crime (becomes) the function of the state alone."
io6. Cf Mandery, supra note 74, at 298-3oi (setting out efficiency justification for compensation
schemes for the wrongfully convicted). See generally Laufer, supra note 5.335-36, 385-87 (1995). State
and federal erroneous conviction statutes force the claimant to demonstrate factual innocence, which
is completely contrary to the ordinary presumption of innocence. Id.
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jurisprudence.
Just compensation jurisprudence provides compensation in
circumstances where we do not question the public policy advanced by
governmental conduct, but simply seek to spread the resulting costs.
Thus, the Federal Just Compensation Clause provides: "[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.""
The Just Compensation Clause is meant "to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole..'. 8 The Just
Compensation Clause therefore is a logical constitutional foundation for
providing compensation to the wrongfully convicted." 9 Unfortunately,
conventional Just Compensation Clause-based arguments for providing
compensation for the wrongfully convicted have been seriously flawed.
IV. FLAWED "THING-THINKING": JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE
ARGUMENTS FOR PROVIDING COMPENSATION TO THE WRONGFULLY
CONVICTED

From time to time, scholars have suggested that Just Compensation
Clause arguments should be used for compensating victims of wrongful
convictions. As early as 1912, Edwin M. Borchard and John H. Wigmore
urged compensation for those wrongfully convicted." ' Borchard focused
his attention on the problem of overcoming common law principles of
sovereign immunity that prevented governments from being held liable
in tort."' He subsequently put the two fields together in a book that
documented sixty-five cases of wrongful conviction and urged: "[I]f...
an innocent man is convicted of crime.., the least that the State can do
to vindicate itself and make restitution to the innocent victim is to grant
him an indemnity, not as a matter of grace and favor but as a matter of
right .... He also proposed a model statute, which resulted in the
enactment of the federal statute providing for compensation to the
wrongfully convicted." 3 Borchard based his arguments squarely on Just
Compensation Clause principles:
Although my major interests lie in an aspect of the law somewhat
remote from criminal law, I have nevertheless long urged that the State
or community assume the risks of official wrongdoing and error instead
107. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

io8. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (596o). See generally
supra note 4.

MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT

TAKINGS,

I09. See Master, supra note 91, at 117-20.

IIo. See Edwin M. Borchard, European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 3
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 684, 705-o6 (1912); John H. Wigmore, The Bill to Make Compensation to
Persons Erroneously Convicted of Crime, 3 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 665, 665-67 (I912).
III. Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. I, 1 (1924).
112. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, supra note I, at xxiv.
113. Id. at 417-2I; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 (2000).
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of permitting the losses resulting from such fault or mistake to be
borne by the injured individual alone."'

Borchard also provided an excellent world history of compensation
for wrongful convictions, spanning from ancient Greece and Rome,
through European and Latin American systems for providing such
compensation, to legislation in the United States providing such
remedies as of 1932."' All of these proposals, however, have utilized a
"thing-thinking" conception of property, a conception that ultimately
dooms the proposals to failure.
A physical definition of property treats property as consisting of
"things," such as cars or land."6 The physical conception of property has
proved resilient because of the intuitive, common-sense appeal that
property is something we can touch, see or feel."7 Such a conception,
however, is a seriously flawed foundation for wrongful conviction relief.
Existing Just Compensation Clause theories for providing compensation
to the wrongfully convicted emerged from "thing-thinking" conceptions
of property. For example, in one article the author argues that
,

114. BORCHARD, supra note 112, at vii; see also Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 49 (I96O)
(explaining that the federal Just Compensation Clause is meant "to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole").
115. BORCHARD, supra note 112, at 38o-87. Several student notes have addressed this issue as well.
See, e.g., John J. Johnston, Comment & Note, Reasonover v. Washington: Toward a Just Treatment of
the Wrongly Convicted in Missouri, 68 UMKC L. REV. 411, 413-14 (200o)
(dismissing a Just
Compensation Clause foundation for compensation for wrongful convictions because one cannot
ostensibly be compensated for a deprivation of liberty); Joseph H. King, Jr., Comment, Compensation
of Persons Erroneously Confined by the State, 1 i8 U. PA. L. REv. 1091, 1092-93 (1970) (raising the
possibility of takings as a theoretical foundation for compensation for the wrongfully convicted, but
dismissing it, ostensibly because it is not strict-liability based; "the eminent domain thesis raises a
specter of technical obstacles to recovery obfuscating the more immediate issue of redress"); Master,
supra note 91, at 120-47 (2004) (focusing on decisions regarding governmental appropriations of labor
as possible sources for constitutional takings claims for compensation for harm resulting from
wrongful convictions); Ashley H. Wisneski, Note, 'That's Just Not Right': Monetary Compensationfor
the Wrongly Convicted in Massachusetts,88 MASs. L. REV. 138, 145-47 (2004) (viewing Takings Clause
as unlikely source because property is only tangible or real property); Zaremski, supra note 74, at 42930 (discussing takings as a theoretical foundation for compensation for the wrongfully convicted, but
merely urging state waiver of sovereign immunity or enactment of a state statute providing for such
compensation rather than suggesting the possibility of an independent constitutional claim). For an
examination of compensation for persons wrongfully detained in the war on terrorism, see Ackerman,
supra note 2, at lO63-66. Ackerman notes that "[t]here has never been a Supreme Court decision
squarely confronting an innocent's claim to compensation under the Takings Clause." Id. at 1O63 n.8I.
He further notes that "[t]here has been remarkably little legal scholarship on this issue." Id. at io64
n.85. For an article discussing conceptualization of reparations for slavery based on Just Compensation
Clause principles, see Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53 AM. U. L.

REV. 191 (2003).

1 16. For criticisms of this conception, see Morris R. Cohen, Propertyand Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 8, i8-9 (1927); Leon Green, Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L. REV. 35, 56-57 (1936); and Joseph
William Singer. The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 6I I, 652-55 (1988).
117. Felix Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property,9 RUTrGERS L. REV. 357, 359-61 (954) (discussing
"thing" conception of property).
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the meaning of state or federal
the productive labor that was
imprisonment and either left to
within prison for little or no

One envisions a lump of labor, like dough, left to waste in the middle
of the prison floor by the government, or used to provide services for the
government. The problem, of course, is that the labor helps to create
property-the asset in question-and is not property in the legal sense.'' 9
The turn toward viewing labor as the property involved is
understandable, given John Locke's theory that because everyone owns
his own person, everyone also owns the object of his labor.' That
statement, however, is more metaphor than legal rule.'"' As evidenced by
restrictions on the sale of nonrenewable body organs such as corneas, it
is folly to think one owns one's body in the same way as one owns a
car.

Building on the example of the commodification of body parts, the
"thing" conception that views the labor of the wrongfully convicted as
the property in question runs into the moral conundrum of treating
people as commodities. Thus, for example, analysis of the question of
compensating victims of societal malfeasance, such as African-American
slaves, or Japanese-Americans interned during World War II, must
almost immediately confront the problem of treating people as
commodities.' 3 The issues raised by commodification of human beingsi18. Master, supra note 91, at 12o. The author derives the conception from cases in which courts
held that lawyers forced to represent indigent defendants had been deprived of their "property," in the
form of the lawyers' labor. Id. at 121 n.82.
II9. See Wenger, supra note 115 (using a similar "thing-thinking" conception of property for
purposes of compensation for slavery under just compensation theory).
120. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (169o); see also Otterstedt, supra note 98, at 31 ("The theory of classical liberal
originalism ... applied in this article to the problem of regulatory takings, is based on the premise that
the ideals of the American Revolution, expressed in the Declaration of Independence, were Lockean
in character.").
121. See generally Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial
Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1983 (2005) ("Courts have never recognized a 'property right
over one's own person'...."). For a refutation of the utility of the statement that one has a property
right over one's body, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTs, PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 36-41
(977) (setting out a similar distinction between general justification and specific justification of
property rights).
122. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 490 (Cal. 199o) (refusing to
recognize spleen cells as objects of "property" rights); State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Fla.
1986) (refusing to recognize corneas as objects of "property" rights). See generally John Martinez, A
Cognitive Science Approach to Teaching Property Rights in Body Parts, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 290 (1992).
123. See Joyce Davis, Enhanced Earning Capacity/Human Capital: The Reluctance to Call It
Property, 17 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 109, io9 (1996) ("Human capital [referring to the investment of
time and money in self development to enhance skills and abilities,] is property and property is
power.") See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparationsfor
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even if in the service of providing reparations for the harm caused by
slavery-has vexed both courts and commentators alike for some time.'24
Ultimately, commodification of people or human body parts founders
not because the market cannot handle such commodities, but because we
have moral, religious or cultural revulsions about treating people as
things that we can treat as objects of property rights.' 25
"Thing-thinking," which views property as the asset, however, only
serves to confound the task of providing compensation for the wrongfully
convicted. It is more than unhelpful; it derails the entire project. We have
to start again and reconsider what it is that we are protecting.
V.

AT THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN LIBERTY AND PROPERTY: RELATIONAL
PROPERTY AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

A.

PROPERTY IN THE DUE PROCESS AND JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSES

The Due Process Clauses of the federal constitution prohibit both

the federal 26 and State'27 governments from depriving people of "life,
liberty or property" without due process of law. The federal Just
Compensation Clause,' 8 as well as Just Compensation provisions in state
constitutions,'29 prohibit the "taking" of "property" without payment of
"just compensation."
Both Due Process and Just Compensation Clauses thus address

Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497 (2003); Monica Chowdry & Charles Mitchell, Responding to
Historic Wrongs: Practical and Theoretical Problems, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (2007); Dennis
Klimchuk, Unjust Enrichment and Reparations for Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REV. 8257 (2004); Eric K.
Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L.

477 (1998) (canvassing reparation movements).
See, e.g., Moore, 793 P.2d at 488-90 (holding that spleen cells removed during surgery are not
"property," and thus cannot be "owned" either by the patient or by the hospital that removed them);
Martinez, supra note 122, at 295 (arguing that rights to property might be disaggregated into their
component parts, leading to limited "property" rights that might address the moral concerns of a body
parts "bazaar"); see also Radhika Rao, Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy Rights in the
Human Body?, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 378, 371 (2007) ("The legal status of the human body is hotly
contested, yet the law of the body remains in a state of confusion and chaos.").
125. Radin has brilliantly explained this rationale in her classic article Market-Inalienability. See
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, ioo HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... ").
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i ("[Nior shall any State deprive any person of... property,
without due process of law ... ").
128. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
i29. State just compensation provisions are similar to the federal Just Compensation Clause,
except that many add that "damaging" of private property will also give rise to just compensation. See,
e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. I, § i9 ("Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just
compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the
owner."); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation.").
REV.

124.
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protection of "property" from governmental conduct, but only Due
Process Clauses refer to protection of "liberty" from government. The
question thereby raised is whether the deprivation of "liberty" under the
Due Process Clauses gives rise to the remedy of "just compensation"
under Just Compensation Clause doctrine.
Although the United States Supreme Court has considered the
relationship between the protection afforded by the Due Process Clauses
and that provided by the Just Compensation Clause, it has not resolved
this central question. In a case just after the Civil War, where the federal
government was held to have taken the estate of Robert E. Lee without
compensation for the establishment of Arlington Cemetery, the Court
briefly discussed the relation between liberty protected under the Due
Process Clause and the requirement of compensation under the Just
Compensation Clause:
[T]he last two clauses of article 5 of the amendments to the
constitution of the United States.. .[provide]: "That no person... shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation." Conceding that the property in controversy in this case
is devoted to a proper public use and that this has been done by those
having authority to establish a cemetery and a fort, the verdict of the
jury finds that it is and was the private property of the plaintiff, and
was taken without any process of law and without any compensation.
Undoubtedly those provisions of the constitution are of that character
which it is intended the courts shall enforce, when cases involving their
operation and effect are brought before them. The instances in which
the life and liberty of the citizen have been protected by the judicial
writ of habeas corpus are too familiar to need citation, and many of
these cases, indeed almost all of them, are those in which life or liberty
was invaded by persons assuming to act under the authority of the
government. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2. If this constitutional
provision is a sufficient authority for the court to interfere to rescue a
prisoner from the hands of those holding him under the asserted
authority of the government, what reason is there that the same courts
shall not give remedy to the citizen whose property has been seized
without due process of law and devoted to public use without just
compensation?'30
In 1938, in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
the Court held that it would exercise strict judicial review for protection
of individual liberties, but only rational relationship review for protection
of property rights under the federal constitution.'3 ' That case dealt with
the institutional position of the Court vis-a-vis the other branches of the
federal government and the States, however, and not with whether the
remedy of just compensation would be triggered by deprivations of

130. United States v. Lee, io6 U.S. 196, 218 (1882).
131. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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liberty without due process.
More recently, in its 2005 decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc.,'32 the Court held that the Just Compensation Clause protects against
untoward burdens on the property rights of an owner, not on the
logically antecedent inquiry about the validity of governmental
conduct.'33 The Court thereby suggested that whether governmental
action is valid is the province of the Due Process Clause, whereas the
Just Compensation Clause focuses on the nature and extent of the
burden imposed on the owner.'34 Lingle concerned a state-imposed cap
on the rent which oil companies in Hawaii could charge independent
lessee-dealers. Thus, the Court did not consider, nor was it required to
address, whether the remedy of just compensation would be triggered by
deprivations of liberty without due process in the context of wrongful
convictions.
B.

THE ESSENTIAL LINK BETWEEN LIBERTY AND PROPERTY

Liberty and property are equally indispensable for achieving the
ideal of individual self-realization. Viewed through that lens, John
Locke's philosophy about legal recognition of property rights can be seen
as a re-affirmation of individual freedom.'33 One must have liberty in
order to mix one's labor with natural resources and produce
assets of
6
value in the marketplace which one can then call one's own.1
And conversely, one must have property in order to be truly free. As
Justice Thurgood Marshall observed in i980: "The constitutional terms
'life, liberty, and property'... establish[] a sphere of private autonomy
which government is bound to respect."'37

132. 544 U.S. 528 (2oo5).
133. See MARTINEZ & LIBONATI, supra note 82, at 6-7 (noting first question as whether government
has "power," and second question as whether there is a "limitation" on that power).
134. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 ("Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be
characterized as unified, these three inquiries (reflected in Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central ) share a
common touchstone. Each aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the
classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his
domain. Accordingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that
government imposes upon private property rights.").
135. See Catherine Valcke, Locke on Property: A Deontological Interpretation, 12 HARV. J.L. &
,
PUB. POL'Y 941 944 (1989) ("The inconsistencies of which Locke has been accused are solved when his
theory is interpreted by appeal to the ideal of individual self-realization rather than to that of common
survival.").
136. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,
supra note 120, §§ 28, 34 (discussing "mixing" of labor with the common to create property); cf.
BECKER, supra note 121, at 75-80 (setting out an argument for political liberty as a general justification
for property rights). See generally MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 33 (1976) ("Any
man's property is ipso facto what he produces,i.e. what he transforms into use by his own efforts.").
137. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93-94 (198o) (Marshall, J., concurring); see
also Valcke, supra note 135, at 1004-05 ("[Alppropriation is more to mankind than a mere tool for
physical subsistence; it plays a fundamental part in the development of individual autonomy."). For a
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Liberty to acquire property rights represents the freedom to acquire
authority over others in regard to assets we call our own.' Property is
not an object apart from those who own, but intrinsic to the lives of the
owners.'39 Property ownership fulfills various functions, including the
ability to use assets for self-expressive, developmental, productive, and
survival activities. 40 Property ownership also fulfills a "welfare function"
intended to secure an individual's claim to resources that are essential to
a meaningful life.'4 ' The liberty to acquire property rights thus is
indispensable for a person to survive and, indeed, to thrive in our
society."2
Since deprivations of liberty brought about by wrongful convictions
inevitably have economic consequences, such deprivations should be
treated as a takings of property for which just compensation is
constitutionally compelled.'43 Indeed, the obligation to provide
compensation for deprivations of liberty is even more compelling than
when mere economic assets are affected. In that sense, footnote four of
Carolene Products was right: we should more jealously guard against
deprivations of liberty than against deprivations of economic interests
alone.'"
We therefore should provide a remedy when "liberty-property" is
taken by the government through wrongful convictions.
C. RELATIONAL PROPERTY: TOWARD LIBERTY DEPRIVATIONS AS TAKINGS
OF PROPERTY

The fundamental shortcoming of the "thing-thinking" conception of
property is that its focus is misdirected onto the asset involved. Assets do

discussion of the functions that property serves in personal self-fulfillment, see John Martinez,
Reconstructing the Takings Doctrine by Redefining Property and Sovereignty, I6 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
157, 190-93 (I988).
138. See Baker, Propertyand Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
741, 742-43 (1986) ("Property is an aspect of relations between people. It consists of decisionmaking
authority[, which] ... refers to the role of property as a claim that other people ought to accede to the
will of the owner....").
139. See generally Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959-6t (1982)
(discussing the relation between assets and realization of the person through control of resources
necessary for a full life).
140. See Baker, supra note 138, at 746-47 (describing these various functions of property rights).
141. Id. at 745; see also Martinez, supra note 137, at 157 (discussing the quasi-governmental power
over people and things that property ownership entails).
142. See generally Wayne McCormack, Lochner, Liberty, Property,and Human Rights, I N.Y.U. J.
L. & LIBERTY 432 (2005) (tracing history of general concept of liberty and its relation to protecting
property rights and personal autonomy).
143. Cf Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1952-54 (2005) (discussing legislative proposal and arguing that pretrial
detention is a compensable "taking" by the state of one's liberty but would exclude bail hearing
detentions of forty-eight hours or less, as well as home detention and electronic monitoring).
144. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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not have rights; people have rights. In order to move toward
understanding liberty deprivations as takings of property, we therefore
need to move from "thing-thinking" to "relational-thinking" in regard to

property.
A relational conception treats property as legal relations.' 45 The
focus of relational property is on the "bundle of rights," consisting of the
rights to exclude, use, and transfer among people in reference to assets.
In contrast, "thing-thinking" conceptions of property focus on46the asset
involved, rather than on the legal rights of the people involved.1
The distinction can be viewed in cognitive terms' 47 as an inverted
triangle, in which the Asset is at the bottom of the triangle, the Owner is
at the top left and the World is at the top right, as follows:

Owner

World

Asset
In "thing-thinking," the property is conceived as the asset at the
bottom of the triangle. In relational thinking, the property is conceived
as the legal relation between the Owner and the World, expressed in
terms of the bundle of rights to exclude, use, and transfer. Thus, "thingthinking" conceives of property as the asset involved, as in the
expression, "the car is my property." A relational conception expresses
"property" as the rights to exclude, use, and transfer in relation to the
World, with respect to the Asset. Thus, in relational terms, one might
express ownership of a car as: "in relation to the World, I can use,
transfer, and exclude others with respect to my car."
Relational thinking thus focuses on rights, not on assets.
145. See generally Cohen, supra note i16, at 8; Green, supra note 116, at 35; Singer, supra note 116,
at 611.
146. A variant of "thing-thinking" describes "property" as the relation of people to assets. See, e.g.,
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 531 (2005)
("[Piroperty law recognizes and helps create stable relationships between persons and assets ....
");
see also Menachem Mautner, "The Eternal Triangles of the Law": Toward a Theory of Prioritiesin
Conflicts Involving Remote Parties,90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 124 n.97 (5991) (explaning the atavistic notion
that we have relations with our assets); Valcke, supra note 135, at 971 ("[Olne can view property as a

relational phenomenon among individuals rather than as an absolute bond between an individual and
a thing."). This variant of "thing-thinking" thus takes the discussion only halfway toward focusing on
the relations among people with respect to assets.
147. For a discussion of the use of cognitive conceptions to describe legal relations, see Martinez,
supra note 122, at 290.
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Accordingly, relational property, like liberty, consists of rights.
The United States Supreme Court also has recognized the
distinction between "thing-thinking" and "relational" thinking about
property. In United States v. General Motors Corp., the Court explained
that the term "property" in the federal constitution is not
used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of the physical thing with
respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law ... [but
instead] in a more accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering
in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use
and dispose of it.'
In GeneralMotors, the United States government condemned a one-year
sublease of General Motor's lease of a warehouse.'49 The government
contended that the "property" condemned consisted only of the physical
lease premises. 5 ' The Court held instead that the "property" condemned
consisted of the lease premises, plus the cost of removing General
Motors' personal property from the building which was necessitated by
the taking, as well as the value of General Motors' equipment and the
value of fixtures which were taken, destroyed, or reduced in value by the
Government's action.' The additional items of personal property,
equipment and fixtures, the Court held, were also part of the "property"
condemned, in addition to the value of the lease premises.' The Court
thereby protected General Motor's right to exclude the federal
government from interfering with General Motors' ability to continue its
operations and maintain its relations with its customers. Property
protected by the Federal Constitution, therefore, is not the physical
thing, but a person's legal rights in relation to other people with respect
to assets.
State courts similarly define property in terms of a person's legal
rights in relation to other people with respect to assets.'53 For example, in
Rigney v. City of Chicago,'54 the rental value of an owner's land had been
reduced from $6o a month to $23, and the market value of the land had
been reduced by two-thirds, as a result of the city's elevating the level of

148.
149.
150.
151.

323 U.S. 373, 377-88 (1945).

Id. at 375.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 383-84.
152. Id. at 381-84.
153. See, e.g., Morley v. Jackson Redev. Auth., 632 So. 2d 1284, 1297 (Miss. 1994) (involving
restrictive covenant protectible property interest); McNamara v. Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640, 645 (Ohio
2005) (involving property interest in groundwater underlying land); Lincoln Loan Co. v. State
Highway Comm'n, 545 P.2d 105, IO9 (Or. 1976) (involving impact on land of pre-condemnation
blight); Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 199o) (inolving express easement);
Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1974) (involving implied easement).
154. 102 111.64 (188).
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streets above the level of the land abutting the streets.'55 The court
explained the distinction between "thing-thinking" and "relational"
property conceptions thus:
Property, in its appropriate sense, means that dominion or indefinite
right of user and disposition which one may lawfully exercise over
particular things and subjects, and generally to the exclusion of all
others, and doubtless this is substantially the sense in which it is used in
the constitution; yet the term is often used to indicate the res or the
subject of the property, rather than the property itself, and it is
evidently used in this sense in some of the cases in connection with the
expression of physical injury, while at other times it is probably used in
its more appropriate sense, as above mentioned. The meaning,
therefore, of the expression "physicalinjury," when used in connection
with the term property, would in any case necessarily depend upon
whether the term property was used in the one sense or the other. To
illustrate: If the lot and buildings of appellant are to be regarded as
property, and not merely the subject of property, as strictly speaking
they are, then there has clearly been no physical injury to it; but if by
property is meant the right of user, enjoyment and disposition of the
lot and buildings, then it is evident there has been a direct physical
interference with appellant's property, and when considered from this
aspect, it may appropriately be said the injury to the property is direct
and physical ....

A relational understanding of "property" as legal rights therefore
liberates us to consider compensation for wrongful convictions, which are
deprivations of liberty rights.

VI. WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AS RIGHTFUL TAKINGS: A
RECONSTRUCTED JUST COMPENSATION JURISPRUDENCE FOR PROTECTION
OF "LIBERTY-PROPERTY"
Conventional takings claims require that the claimant identify the
property involved, the governmental conduct that has resulted in a
taking of that property, and the just compensation to which the claimant
is entitled.'57 This Article proposes that "liberty-property" takings claims
entail (a) a wrongful conviction resulting in the taking of liberty which
imposes economic harm; (b) strict liability regardless of fault; and (c)
remedial considerations which shape the scope of "liberty-takings."
A.

THE TAKING OF LIBERTY: FOCUS ON THE HARM IMPOSED

One of the stumbling blocks erected by "thing-thinking" about
property has been the problem of attempting to conceive of the manner
in which an asset is "taken" by the government when a person is

155. Id. at 69.

i56. Id. at 77-78.
157. See generally 3

SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 4,
§ 16.53.20 (confusing takings cases on the merits: a three-part analytical framework).
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wrongfully convicted.'" This has led some to argue that the labor value of
the person wrongfully convicted has been taken by the government. 5 9
A relational reconceptualization of property as legal rights focuses
instead on the consequences of the deprivation of liberty. A wrongful
conviction prevents the wrongfully convicted person from exercising the
freedom to mix his or her labor with natural resources and thereby to
create legal rights in relation to the world with respect to those assets.
The deprivation of liberty thereby imposes harm that can be measured as
the lost opportunity to establish legal rights in relation to the world with
respect to assets.
A reconstructed just compensation jurisprudence, therefore,
incorporates relational thinking about property rather than "thingthinking" about property. That is, rather than asking, "What is the asset
that has been 'taken' by government through wrongful convictions?" we
should ask, "What is the economic loss to the person wrongfully
convicted as a result of the deprivation of their liberty?"
This is consistent with the shift in just compensation jurisprudence
away from focusing on the gain to the government and toward focusing
instead on the loss suffered by the person whose property has been
"taken." Thus, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized that
"the 'just compensation' required by the Fifth Amendment is measured
by the property owner's loss rather than the government's gain." '6° The
Court has reiterated that just compensation jurisprudence focuses on the
nature and extent of the burden imposed on the owner: "Although our
regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified...
each of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that
government imposes upon private property rights." 6 '
The requirement of just compensation thus is not premised on what
the wrongdoer has gained, such as in unjust enrichment or restitutionary
theories.
Instead, the remedy of just compensation seeks to
compensate for the burden on the person wrongfully convicted.
B.

TAKINGS AS STRICT LIABILITY CLAIMS

As a general rule, takings are strict liability claims.' 63 Thus, although
158. See BORCHARD, supra note lo8, at 388 ("In the case of unjust conviction the State receives no
equivalent. The deprivation of the liberty of the individual is no gain to the State.").
159. See, e.g., Master, supra note 91, at 120.
16o. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235-36 (2003).
161. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (emphasis added).
162. See Chowdry & Mitchell, supra note 123, at 344-45 (discussing gain-based arguments); see
also Brophy, supra note 123, at 521 (2003) (noting that "reparations" talk raises the specter that
benefits received by slaves would have to be set off from recovery for harm imposed on slaves by
being held as slaves); Klimchuk, supra note 123, at 1275 (focusing on benefit to slave owners of
treating slaves as things rather than as persons).
163. See generally Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 ("[A] plaintiff seeking to challenge a government

February 2008]

WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

a few courts have concluded otherwise,' fault, in the form of intentional,
reckless or negligent conduct, need not be shown in order to impose
liability for takings. Accordingly, a takings claim would be available
regardless of whether a wrongful conviction has resulted from
substantive or procedural wrongfulness.65
C.

REMEDIAL CONSIDERATIONS

The right to compensation for liberty deprivations, as with all rights,
is not absolute. This Article has established a general justification for the
existence of such a right, but that right is nevertheless subject to specific
justification identifying the conditions for relief in particular cases.66
Remedial considerations in the field of wrongful convictions thus include
restrictions on such claims as well as defenses against them.
i. Compensation, Not Deterrence
It has been argued that the basic purposes of monetary remedies for
constitutional violations include both compensation and deterrence.' 61 It
has been further argued that punitive damages for constitutional torts
should be the norm rather than the exception in order to effectuate
deterrence.'6 Such arguments are derived from the measure of damages
for the common law tort of false imprisonment,' 69 which may be
regulation as an uncompensated taking of private property may proceed under one of the [following]
theories ...by alleging a 'physical' taking, a Lucas-type 'total regulatory taking,' a Penn Central
taking, or a land-use exaction violating the standards set forth in Nollan and Dolan."); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Albers v. County of L.A., 398 P.2d 129, 263-64 (Cal. 1965)

(inverse condemnation is strict liability claim); Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego, 96 Cal. Rptr. 897, 913
(Ct. App. 2000) ("Because damages caused by failure of a water delivery system do not resemble
damages caused by failure of a flood control system, we conclude the.., reasonableness test should
not be extended to the facts of this case, and the ordinary rules of inverse condemnation strict liability
for damages caused by public improvements are applicable."); Barto Watson, Inc. v. City of Houston,
998 S.W.2d 637, 642 (Tex. App. 1999) (holding that mistake is no defense to inverse condemnation
claim under state law; need not allege intentional conduct).
164. Some courts, particularly in regard to flood control improvements, require a showing that the
government acted negligently. See, e.g., Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 935 P.2d 796 (Cal.
1997) (holding that inverse condemnation is ordinarily a strict liability claim, except that
reasonableness standard applies in flood control "common enemy" and in "emergency" settings). And
a few courts require a showing that the government intended to take private property for public use.
See, e.g., Vokoun v. City of Lake Oswego, 56 P.3d 396, 4oi (Or. 2002) (holding that construction of
storm drain not done with intent to take private property for public use); Edwards v. Hallsdale-Powell
Util. Dist. Knox County, Tenn., 115 S.W.3d 461, 467-68 (Tenn. 2003) (holding no taking where
claimants' homes were flooded with raw sewage on two occasions absent purposeful or intentional
actions and overruling contrary precedent).
165. For definitions of procedural and substantive wrongfulness, see Part I.A.i. above.
166. Cf.BECKER, supra note 121, at 3 (setting out a similar distinction between general justification
and specific justification of property rights).
167. See Jean C. Love, Presumed General Compensatory Damages in Constitutional Tort
Litigation:A CorrectiveJustice Perspective, 49 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 67, 68 (1992).

168. Michael Wells, Punitive Damagesfor ConstitutionalTorts, 56 LA. L. REV.841, 858 (1996).
169. Cf Wallace v. Kato, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 1095-96 (2007) (explaining that common law claim of
false imprisonment is useful analogy in determining when statute of limitations starts to run for claim
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summarized as follows:
The measure of damages for false imprisonment is such sum that
would fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff for injuries
caused by defendant's wrongful act, including damages for mental
anguish, shame and humiliation, injury to reputation, physical
suffering, loss of earnings, and legal expenses in defending a prior
action so long as the damages are proximately caused by the illegal
act. 7

Indeed, false imprisonment at common law gives rise to presumed
damages even in the absence of actual damages because it is a type of
"dignitary tort" which is "a technical assault [even] without physical
harm."''7' Punitive damages are also recoverable for such claims.'72
Viewed in relational terms, however, deprivations of liberty which
give rise to the remedy of just compensation are fundamentally
compensatory in nature. The objective is compensation, not deterrence.
Thus, there are no "presumed damages" from violation of such rights.'73
Under a compensatory regime, the claimant must prove "actual injury,"
meaning "something personal to the plaintiff, such as pecuniary loss, pain
or emotional distress."'74

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages personally against police officers for arrest that violated
Fourth Amendment; involving a plaintiff's cause of action that accrued when he appeared before
examining magistrate and was bound over for trial, not when conviction was later set aside or when
prosecutors subsequently dropped all charges after appellate reversal of wrongful conviction).
170. Kehrli v. City of Utica, 482 N.Y.S.2d 189, I9O (1984); see also Mumford v. Starmont, 102 N.W.
662, 664 (Mich. 1905) (considering shame and mortification of wrong and of outrage); Rainey v.
Lorain Corr. Facility, 700 N.E.2d 9o, 93 (Ohio 1997) (holding that where plaintiff was imprisoned
fourteen days beyond his lawful term, "the measure of damages for false imprisonment is that sum that
will reasonably compensate the plaintiff for the wrong done him, which may include the injury to his
feelings, damage to his reputation, and other elements which combined to make up the injury
naturally flowing from the wrong").
171. 2 DAN B. DoBas, LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.3(2) (2d ed. 1993).
172. See, e.g., Washington v. Farlice, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607, 614 (1991) (reversing $50,00o punitive
damage award, but remanding for re-determination based on evidence of appellant's financial
condition at the time of re-trial).
173. See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986) (allowing no award
of damages based on abstract value of constitutional rights); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262-64
(1978) (allowing no presumed damages for violation of procedural due process); 2 DOBBS, supra note
171, § 7.4(2) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court has foreclosed the recovery of... presumed general damages."
(citing Jean C. Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CAL. L. REV.
1242 (1979))).

174. 2 DOaBS, supra note 171, § 7.4(2) (citing Love, supra note 173, at 1259). For example, a federal
district court held that the value of the harm imposed on defendants who had spent over thirty years in
prison, some on death row, was $1 million per year. Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D.
Mass. 2007); see also supra note Io. The total damages award for the individuals and their families in
the Limone case was $1o1,75o.oo.oo. Limone, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 154. Attorneys' fees are yet to be
determined. Order Re: Damages at 2, Limone v. United States, No. 020Vio8 9 o-NG (D. Mass. July 26,
2007) ("Plaintiffs shall submit a motion for attorneys' fees and costs, with supporting affidavits by
September 17, 2007.").
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2.
Claims Against FederalEntities and Officials
The Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause is self-executing,
so takings claims against the federal government as an entity may be
brought directly under the federal constitution.'75 The Tucker Act, 6 is the
usual vehicle for enforcing federal constitutional claims'77 against actors

175. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933). The right to just compensation
was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that condemnation proceedings were not
instituted and that the right was asserted in suits by the owners did not change the essential
nature of the claim. The form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon the
Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary. A promise to pay was not
necessary. Such a promise was implied because the duty to pay imposed by the [Fifth
A]mendment.
Id.; see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304,
315 (1987) ("[I]t has been established at least since Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13 (1933), that
claims for just compensation are grounded in the Constitution itself."); United States v. Clarke, 445
U.S. 253, 257 (198o) ("[An action against the United States may be brought under the Fifth
Amendment's Just Compensation Clause because of] 'the self-executing character of the
constitutional provision with respect to compensation ....' (citing 6 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972))); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 401 (1976) ("These [Just
Compensation] Fifth Amendment cases are tied to the language, purpose, and self-executing aspects
of that constitutional provision ....
");United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946) ("If there is a
taking, the claim is 'founded upon the Constitution'...."); Bundrick v. U.S., 785 F.2d 1009, 1012 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); Alder v. U.S., 785 F.2d 1004, OO9 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Appellants err in their premise that
each taking claim under the Fifth Amendment requires a specific waiver of sovereign immunity. The
Constitution had already achieved that popular right."). See generally MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT
TAKINGS, supra note 5, § 4:3 n.i (discussing self-executing nature of Just Compensation Clause);
Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1659-62 (1988) (discussing self-executing character of Fifth Amendment's Just
Compensation Clause); James E. Krier, The Regulation Machine, I Sup. CT. ECON. REV. I, II-12
(1982) ("The logic is straightforward.... If it is a taking, then compensation is required [because the
Just Compensation Clause is self-executing] ...
176. The Tucker Act provides:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon
any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § I491(a)(I) (20oo); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, l16-17 (1984)
("Generally, an individual claiming that the United States has taken his property can seek just
compensation under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491.'); Causby, 328 U.S. at 267 ("If there is a taking,
the claim is 'founded upon the Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear
and determine.").
177. In contrast, tort claims against the federal government are governed by the Federal Tort
Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-8o (2000). Since 1974, the federal government has allowed itself to be
sued for certain intentional torts committed by federal "investigative or law enforcement officers." 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2o00). The statute was amended in 1974 by Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 5o, to
add language allowing suits for "assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process or
malicious prosecution." See also Limone v. U.S., 336 F. Supp. 2d 18, 29-30 (D. Mass. 2004) (reviewing
the history of this 1974 amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act). For a discussion of the
distinctions between tort claims and constitutional claims against the federal government, see
MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS, supra note 5, at § 4:4.
Such tort actions, however, are inadequate substitutes for constitutional takings claims, for a
myriad of reasons, including: (i) only conduct by "investigative or law enforcement officers." defined
as "any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence,
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whose conduct is undertaken pursuant to federal law on behalf of the
United States.' 57 Such claims ordinarily must be brought in the United
States Court of Federal Claims.'79 However, federal district courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to consider takings claims against the United
States which do not exceed $io,ooo in amount.'
With respect to suits against federal officials or employees in their
individual, personal capacities, as a general rule, federal constitutional
takings claims cannot be asserted because of the "state action" principle,
which provides that federal constitutional protections only apply against
governmental, not private, conduct.' 8 ' The United States Supreme Court
has held, however, that such claims can be brought in limited situations,
so at first blush, it is at least arguable that such claims should be available
in the wrongful conviction setting as well. In Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Court held that
claims for damages against federal narcotics agents could be brought
directly under the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures because "[h]istorically, damages have
been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal
interests in liberty."' ' 2 In Davis v. Passman, the Court similarly held that
or to make arrests for violations of Federal law" is covered, 28 U.S.C. § 268o(h) (2ooo); (2) the
plaintiff must prove intentional conduct by the officers involved, whereas takings give rise to strict
liability; (3) the statute of limitations for claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act is two years, id.
§ 24 oi(b), whereas the statute of limitations for takings claims is six years, id. § 2501; (4)the Federal
Tort Claims Act requires that the plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies by "presenting" the claim
to the federal agency involved, id. § 2675(a), whereas no such presentment is required for federal
constitutional claims; (5) since the tort claims are Congressionally-created, they can be
Congressionally-repealed, whereas takings claims are constitutional; and (6) the discretionary function
exception in § 268o(a) shields the federal government from claims regarding the decision "whether,
when and against whom to initiate prosecution." Gray v. Bell, 712 F.zd 490, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
178. By comparison, if the conduct of federal actors is instead undertaken under color of state law,
the usual vehicle for enforcing takings claims against such actors is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2ooo).
179. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. I, 12 (199O); Causby, 328 U.S. at 267;

Moden v. United States, 404 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
I8o. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000). This is known as the "Little Tucker Act," which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court
of Federal Claims, of . . . any . . . civil action or claim against the United States, not

exceeding $io,ooo in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort ...[with the exception of cases] which are subject to sections 8(g)(i) and
io(a)(i) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.
Id.; see also Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 540 n.14, (1999) (describing Little Tucker Act
jurisdiction of federal district courts: "Appeals are taken to the Federal Circuit").
181. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982); see Martin A. Schwartz, Claims
for Damages for Violations of State Constitutional Rights-Analysis of the Recent Court of Appeals
Decision in Brown v. New York; The Resolved and Unresolved Issues, 14 TouRo L. REV. 657, 66o
(5998) ("Maybe this is just one of those curiosities in the history of American law, but the Congress
has never enacted a counterpart statute to Section 1983 that authorizes claims for damages for federal
constitutional violations against federal officials.")
182. 403 U.S. 388, 395 (971).
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a Bivens action could be brought under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment personally against a federal Congressman for gender
discrimination.8 And in Carlson v. Green, the Court implied a Bivens
claim against federal prison officials under the Eighth Amendment for
cruel and unusual punishment. '
Since wrongful convictions deprive claimants of liberty under the
Due Process Clause, it is therefore at least arguable that a Bivens action
should be available against federal officials and employees in their
personal capacity to enforce the just compensation requirement of the
federal Just Compensation Clause. Passman implied an action under the
Due Process Clause, and Carlson involved the correctional setting. The
due process liberty deprivation in the wrongful conviction setting, and
the concomitant compensation requirement of the Just Compensation
85
Clause, thus would seem to fall in the same Bivens category.'
The availability of a reasonable alternative statutory remedy,
however, will probably preclude a Bivens claim."' In Wilkie v. Robbins,
the United States Supreme Court held that a private landowner had no
private right of action for damages under Bivens against officials of the
Bureau of Land Management personally for harassment and intimidation
allegedly aimed at extracting an easement across the landowner's private
property."' The Court held that the landowner had other claims available
and that the balance of reasons weighed against creating a new cause of
action under the circumstances."' Significantly, perhaps, the Court
appeared to distinguish circumstances where deprivations of liberty have
183.

442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979).
184. 446 U.S. 14,24-25 (198o).
185. Bivens actions are available only against federal officials personally, not against the federal
government entity. See FDIC v. Meyer, 5io U.S. 471,486 (994); see also Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct.
2588, 2590 (2oo7) (holding that private landowner has no private right of action for damages under
Bivens against officials of the Bureau of Land Management for violation of landowner's Just
Compensation Clause right). The federal government entity can be sued, however, pursuant to the
self-executing character of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause. Jacobs v. United States,
290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933). See generally Jeremy Travis, Rethinking Sovereign Immunity After Bivens, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 645-46 (1982) (distinguishing Bivens actions from cases brought under the selfexecuting Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
186. See, e.g., Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2591-92 (holding private landowner has no private right of
action for damages under Bivens against officials of the Bureau of Land Management for harassment
and intimidation by BLM officials against landowner allegedly aimed at extracting an easement across
landowner's private property because: first, landowner has plenty of other claims available; second,
balance of reasons for and against creating new cause of action weighs against creating such new cause
of action; and third, the landowner context is distinguishable from circumstances where liberty is
deprived).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 26oo ("Here, the competing arguments boil down to one on a side: from Robbins, the
inadequacy of discrete, incident-by-incident remedies; and from the Government and its employees,
the difficulty of defining limits to legitimate zeal on the public's behalf in situations where hard
bargaining is to be expected in the back-and-forth between public and private interests that the
Government's employees engage in every day.").
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occurred. "
8

In the wrongful conviction setting, therefore, it would not be
surprising if the individual federal-official or employee defendant would
contend that the federal wrongful conviction compensation statute
represents an available alternative remedy that would similarly preclude
a Bivens action asserting wrongful conviction claims.' 9° That statute has
proven ineffectual in providing relief in the wrongful conviction setting. 9'
Nevertheless, a Bivens liberty-property deprivation action against federal
officials and employees in their personal capacities would probably be
precluded.'92
3.

Claims Against State and Local Government Entities and
Officials

With respect to federal constitutional claims against States, the
United States Supreme Court held in 1989 that Congress did not intend
that States could be sued as "persons" under § I983." 3 Suits against

States under the Federal Just Compensation Clause for harm resulting
from wrongful convictions, however, are available under the Fifth
Amendment's self-executing Just Compensation Clause.' 94

With

respect

to federal

constitutional

claims

against

local

governments such as cities and counties, 42 U.S.C. § J983 provides that

relief may be sought for deprivation of federal rights by defendants

189. Id. at 26oi (distinguishing circumstances where First Amendment speech rights, Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury are
involved).
s9o. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 (2000).
191. See, e.g., Laufer, supra note 5, at 387 ("[Tjhe federal compensation statute allows for the
recovery of a very small award of damages. Even so, meeting the statutory requirements for recovery
is difficult, indeed, and few petitioners are successful."); Lopez, supra note 57, at 672-73 (pointing out
that requirements that claimant prove he is not guilty or has been pardoned, and that he did not
commit the offense charged, as well as the $5,00o cap on recovery, make the statute practically
useless); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (200o) (codifying the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 and
restricting ability of prisoners to proceed in forma pauperis in federal courts and curtailing their right
to claim damages for psychological injury without accompanying physical injury); Robertson, supra
note 90, at 24 (arguing that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 unconstitutionally deprives
prisoners of Equal Protection).
192. Cf. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2590.
193. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63 (1989).
194. Jacobs v United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933) ("[Tjhe right to just compensation] was
guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that
the right was asserted in suits by the owners did not change the essential nature of the claim. The form
of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition
was not necessary. A promise to pay was not necessary. Such a promise was implied because the duty
to pay imposed by the [Fifth A]mendment."); Manning v. N.M. Energy, Minerals & Natural Res.
Dep't, 144 P. 3 d 87, 96 (N.M. 2oo6) (authorizing direct action against the State under federal
Constitution). See generally Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 493, 601-02 (20o6) ("Indeed, text, structure, and, I would argue,

history suggest that the Takings Clause should trump state sovereign immunity.")
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implementing governmental custom or policy under color of state law.'95
Actions under the self-executing Federal Just Compensation Clause
would be available against local government entities as well.' 6 Just
compensation claims against states and local governments under state
constitutions for harm caused by wrongful convictions also may be
brought if state precedent establishes
the availability of such claims as a
97
matter of state constitutional law.
With respect to suits against state and local officials or employees in
their individual, personal capacities, federal constitutional claims implied
as direct actions from the constitution under Bivens clearly are not
available because an action can be brought under 42 U.S.C. § I983.'o
Accordingly, any claim against state or local government officials or
employees in their personal capacities based on wrongful convictions
would have to be brought under that section.
State constitutional claims implied as direct actions from state
constitutions against State or local government officials in their personal
capacities, analogous to Bivens actions under the federal constitution,
have met a mixed response among state supreme courts.'" No state
supreme court decision has addressed whether wrongful convictions can
be remedied as set forth in this Article.
In contrast to federal constitutional claims, the state action
requirement for purposes of state constitutional claims may allow such
claims to be brought against otherwise purely private actors even though
the connection between the government and the defendants would not
meet federal state action requirements. State courts differ on whether the
state action requirement applies to claims asserted under state
constitutions.2 "
195. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.").
196. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, I66 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment's Just Compensation Clause is self-executing and applies to city through Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause).
197. See, e.g., Heughs Land. L.L.C. v. Holladay City, 113 P.3d 1024 (Utah 2005); Colman v. Utah
State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah i99o).

198. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,397 (197).
i99. For an excellent discussion of such claims, see JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES ch. 7 ( 4 th ed. 2006) (discussing civil actions to
enforce state constitutional rights). See generally Schwartz, supra note 181, at 657.
200. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919 v. Crystal Mall Ass'n, 852
A.2d 659, 671 n.21 (Conn. 2004) (discussing state action requirement for purposes of state
constitutional claims); Price v. U-Haul Co. of La., 745 So. 2d 593 664-73 (La. '999) (adopting flexible
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4. PersonalLiability Defenses
As a practical matter, defendants acting in their personal capacities

are unlikely to have the deep pockets required for a substantial claim of
compensation. Claims for wrongful conviction against federal, state or
local government officials or employees in their personal capacities are
unlikely to be successful. Legally, federal constitutional claims are not
available for claims against federal defendants where such defendants act
personally, outside their authority, thus negating the state action

requirement."' Further, in order to assert a claim against a federal
defendant personally under the Federal Constitution, a claimant must
demonstrate the defendant acted beyond the scope of employment, in his

or her personal capacity. In addition to that requirement, a prima facie
case against a state or local government defendant in his or her personal
capacity
must demonstrate that the defendant acted "under color of state
°
law."

In addition, for purposes of absolute immunity and qualified
immunity defenses, the United States Supreme Court appears to treat
§ 1983 actions against defendants personally acting under color of state
law and Bivens actions against defendants personally acting under color
of federal law the same." Absolute immunity is available to judges,
prosecutors and parole-board members.2" Qualified immunity shields
government officials from personal liability for civil damages as long as
their conduct is "objectively reasonable... 5 The objective reasonableness
approach to determining whether state action is present for purposes of state constitutional claims);
Batchelder v. Allied Stores Intern., Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590,593-94 (Mass. 1983) (holding that state action
requirement does not apply to state constitutional claim); see also Martin Margulies, A Terrible
Beauty: Functional State Action Analysis and State Constitutions 9 WHITErR L. REV. 723, 725-26
(1988). But see Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797, 797 (Cal. 2001)
(holding that state action requirement applies under state constitution); Weaver v. AIDS Servs. of
Austin, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 798, 802 n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that state standard for determining
state action for purposes of state constitutional claims does not differ substantially from federal
standard for purposes of federal constitutional claims); Jacobs v. Major, 4o7 N.W.2d 832, 841 (Wis.
1987) (holding that there is a presumption that state constitutional claims can only be asserted against
defendants whose conduct amounts to "state action").
201. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 938 (1982).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). See generally Gary S. Gildin, The Standard of Culpability in Section
1983 and Bivens Actions: The Prima Facie Case, Qualified Immunity and the Constitution, I I HOFSTRA
L. REV. 557, 560 (1983).
203. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 n.2 (1986); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504
(1978). See generally Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The Improper Expansion of

Absolute Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil-Rights Cases, 59 SMU L. REV. 265, 269 n.23 (2oo6)
(agreeing with this assessment).
204. See generally 4 SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 40, at
§ 27:11 (absolute immunity for judicial and legislative functions: state or federal claims against entities
or individuals); Johns, supra note 203, at 265.
205. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 590, (1998); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S 8oo, 815
(1982). See generally 4 SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 40,
§ 27:11.50 (qualified immunity from § 1983 claims against individuals); Gildin, supra note 202, at 557.

February 2008]

WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

standard is measured by whether the conduct in question violates the
plaintiff's "clearly established" statutory or constitutional rights about
which a reasonable person in the position of the defendant official would
have known.2 6
Qualified immunity thus would be available where either (a) a
wrongful conviction was not a constitutional violation; or (b) where the
constitutional violation was not "clearly established" at the time that a
case is first brought." 7 With regard to the first scenario, this Article
argues that such a constitutional right exists. With regard to the second, it
will take adjudication of the first question, at least through a federal
circuit court decision and perhaps even up to the United States Supreme
Court, to "clearly establish" the right exists."'
In summary, recovery for wrongful convictions against governmental
officials and employees in their personal capacities is problematic at best.
5. Governmental Entity Defenses
In Hurtado v. United States, 2°9 the United States Supreme Court
considered whether Mexican immigrant workers imprisoned as material
witnesses in the trials of those who had illegally brought them into the
country were entitled to compensation under the Federal Just
Compensation Clause. The Court held that "the Fifth Amendment does
not require that the Government pay for the performance of a public
duty it is already owed.".. The Court quoted Wigmore on Evidence:
"(I)t may be a sacrifice of time and labor, and thus of ease, of profits,
of livelihood. This contribution is not to be regarded as a gratuity, or a
courtesy, or an ill-required favor. It is a duty not to be grudged or
evaded. Whoever is impelled to evade or to resent it should retire from
the society of organized and civilized communities, and become a
hermit. He who will live by society must let society live by him, when it
requires to."..
The "public duty" rule announced in Hurtado is circular: no
compensation is required for the deprivation of liberty because the
206. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (holding that a media's "ride-along" entry into
a home violates the Fourth Amendment, but because the state of the law was not "clearly established"
at the time the entry in this case took place, respondent officers are entitled to qualified immunity).
207. Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 (2007) (discussing two-step inquiry).
208. See, e.g., Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 516 (Ioth Cir. 1998) (holding that
Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court decision establishing the right sought to be enforced is required);
Cope v. Heltsley, 128 F.3 d 452, 460 (6th Cir. I997) (holding Supreme Court or circuit court decision is
required); Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392 (ioth Cir. 1992) (holding sexual harassment as
equal protection violation not "clearly established" until 1989 and "clearly established" requires
federal circuit court decision); Bates v. Bigger, 192 F. Supp. 2d 16o, 17o-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(examining whether circuit court decisions had established right).
209. 410 U.S. 578, 578-91 (973).
210. Id. at 588. For a discussion of the public duty rule, see Master, supra note 91, at 124-27
(reviewing road construction, military draft, jury service and material witnesses settings).
2t1. Hurtado,410 U.S. at 588-89 n.Io (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 72 (i96I)).
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government already owned the individual's public duty to be deprived of
liberty. In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, a county,
under the authority of a state statute, kept the interest on an interpleader
fund deposited in the registry of the county court, even though under
another state statute, the county also charged for the clerk's services in
holding the fund in the county registry." 2 The Court held that "a State,
by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property
'
without compensation."2 13
Similarly, the public duty rule in Hurtado would allow the
government, by ipse dixit, to transform individual liberty into public
obligation. If it could do so at all," 4 it most certainly cannot do so without
compensation. Principled identification of circumstances in which liberty
deprivations should not trigger the governmental obligation to provide
just compensation requires more than the cavalier "love it or leave it"
attitude evident in Hurtado.
Other governmental defenses are less problematic. In the land use
setting, the United States Supreme Court has formulated three possible
governmental defenses against the obligation to pay just compensation.
The government has the burden of proof with respect to each of these
defenses." 5 Similarly, the government should have the burden of proof in
regard to each of these defenses in the "liberty-property" setting.
First, the law of nuisance may provide that under the circumstances,
in light of the degree of harm to public lands and resources or adjacent
private property posed by the claimant's proposed activities, the social
value of the claimant's activities and their suitability to the locality in
question, and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be
avoided through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or
adjacent private landowners) alike, compensation is not due.6
Analogously, where a wrongfully convicted claimant caused the wrongful
conviction to occur through his or her own conduct, compensation
should not be forthcoming. Thus, the government could avoid liability by
showing its procedurally "wrongful" conduct was induced by the
claimant. For example, this might occur where a claimant invites criminal
prosecution to shield someone else, then seeks compensation because the
conviction was wrongful. Or, in the case of substantive governmental
212. 449 U.S. 155, 155-65 (I98O).
213. Id. at 162.
214. For example, it is beyond debate that the government could not force boys to serve as altar
boys in Catholic churches, even if the government promised to pay just compensation.
215. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 395 (1994) ("[T]he city has not met its burden
of demonstrating [that exaction was roughly proportional to impact of developer's project on public
infrastructure]."); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992) ("South Carolina must
identify background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses [Mr. Lucas] now

intends in the circumstances ...").
216. See Lucas, 5o5 U.S. at 1031.
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"wrongful" conduct, the government could avoid liability by showing the
claimant indeed committed the offense charged. Unlike the criminal
setting, however, the government's burden of proof would be the civil
"preponderance of the evidence" standard.2 7 Unlike under prevalent
statutory wrongful conviction remedies, it would not be up to the
wrongful conviction claimant to prove factual innocence. However, the
government's burden would be lessened.
Second, in the land use setting, background principles of property
law may otherwise limit the nature and extent of the property rights held
by the owner under the circumstances. For example, if under state
property law marshlands come burdened with a public trust, and if an
owner's proposed development project would be contrary to the public
trust, then the owner would have no grounds on which to complain. ' , It
is unlikely that analogous "background principles" of state liberty law
would authorize wrongful convictions.
Third, in the land use setting, circumstances of actual necessity, such
as demolishing a house to prevent the spreading of a fire, will also
absolve the government from liability."9 This emergency exception may
217. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508
U.S. 602, 622 (1993) ("The burden of showing something by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' the
most common standard in the civil law, 'simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of
a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the
burden to persuade the [judge] of the fact's existence." (citations omitted)).
218. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. ("Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership."). See
generally 3 SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 4, § 16.53.3o n.18
(illustrating "background principles" defense).
259. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 n.I6. ("The principal 'otherwise' that we have in mind is litigation
absolving the State (or private entities) of liability for the destruction of 'real and personal property, in
cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire' or to forestall other grave threats to the
lives and property of others."). The court in Lucas cites two illustrations of the "emergency/actual
necessity" defense. In Bowditch v. Boston, sio U.S. 16 (1879), the Court upheld a Boston ordinance
which authorized the city fire department to blow up a house in the path of a fire in order to stop the
spread of a fire, based on the common law principle of "natural law" or "imperative necessity." In
United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887), the Court discussed at length the principle that
private harm resulting from the Civil War was not compensable. See also YMCA v. United States, 395
U.S. 85, 89 (1969) (holding damage caused to a building when federal officers who were seeking to
protect the building were attacked by rioters as not a taking).
These cases tend to preclude compensation when the public need is the greatest and the
impact on the property owner is absolute destruction. Principles limiting the government's avoidance
of an obligation to compensate the owner have proved elusive. Compare Customer Co. v. City of
Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900 (Cal. 1995) (denying recovery to owner whose store was damaged by police
looking for a criminal suspect, on grounds that benefit was conferred and that emergency existed),
with Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. I99I) (entitling owner in similar
circumstances to compensation). The "emergency/actual necessity" defense may be related to the
principle that "highly regulated industries" do not have the same level of protected expectations as
non-highly regulated industries. For example, in Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Fla. Power Corp., 480
U.S. 245, 247 (I987), the Court held that power companies had to allow cable television companies to
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encompass several types of wrongful conviction settings. For example,
Selective Service laws enforcing a mandatory draft during wartime would
not require just compensation." ' Post-9/I i Homeland Security detentions
also might qualify as emergencies for which no compensation is
required."'
CONCLUSION

Our system of criminal justice will inevitably result in wrongful
convictions. Under present law, little compensation is available to those
who suffer harm as a result of such wrongful convictions, and the
compensation that exists is often insufficient. This Article demonstrates
that wrongful convictions arise at the boundary of liberty and property,
and that a reconceptualization of property in relational terms leads to a
reconstructed just compensation jurisprudence that compels the
provision of compensation for those wrongfully convicted.

string their cables on power company telephone poles for a (nominal) rate set by the FCC because the
power companies were a "highly regulated" industry. Similarly, in Mitchell Arms, Inc. v. United States,
7 F.3d 212, (Fed. Cir. 1993), the court held that contracts for assault rifles entered into in reliance on
import permits did not give rise to protectible investment-backed expectations because of the highly
regulated character of the arms industry. See id. at 217. The scope of the "highly regulated industries"
principle is difficult to cabin: Is the development of land into subdivisions a "highly regulated"
industry? In today's welfare state, is every commercial activity of significance "highly regulated" for
this purpose? See generally JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL
RIGrTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES § 7.07[3] (4 th ed. 2006) (discussing state court decisions both ways in
these types of scenarios); 3 SANDS, LIBONATI & MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 4,
§ I6.53.4o n.44 (illustrating emergency/actual necessity defense).
220. See United States v. Hobbs, 450 F.2d 935,936 (ioth Cir. 197i) (upholding mandatory draft).
221. See generally Ackerman, supra note 2, at IO63-66 (dealing with question of compensation for
persons wrongfully detained in the war on terrorism mentioned in passing and noting that there is very

little scholarship on the point); Scott J. Borrowman, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and Abu
Ghraib-Civil Remedies for Victims of ExtraterritorialTorts by U.S. Military Personneland Civilian
Contractors, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371, 372 (arguing victims of Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal

should be provided with civil relief).
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APPENDIX: COMPILATION OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION STATUTES AND
THEIR REQUIREMENTS2 22

Twenty-one states have adopted wrongful conviction statutes to
date:
STATE

STATUTORY DEFINITION OF
"WRONGFUL CONVICTION"

Alabama

(I) Have been convicted

ALA. CODE
§§ 29-2-56 to

by the state of one or
more felony offenses, all
of which the person was
innocent, and have served
time in prison as a result
of the conviction or
convictions; or

-159(2006)

PROCEDURAL
LIMITATIONS

For purposes of
determination of
eligibility for
compensation for
wrongful
incarceration,
innocence shall be
evidenced by at least
one of the following:

REMEDIAL
LIMITATIONS

An award is limited
to $50,000 for each
year incarcerated
(and pro rata for any
portion of a year
served).

Have been
incarcerated pretrial on a (I) The conviction
state felony charge, for at
vacated or reversed
least two years through no and the accusatory
fault of his or her own,
instrument dismissed
before having charges
on grounds of
dismissed based on
innocence; or
innocence.
(2) The accusatory
instrument dismissed
on a ground
consistent with
innocence.
(2)

California

Having been convicted of

CAL. PENAL
CD4
4
§§ 4900-4906
(Deering 2007)

any crime against the
state amounting to a
felony and imprisoned in
the state prison for that
conviction, is granted a

A claim must be
presented to the
California Victim's
Compensation Board
within six months of
judgment of acquittal,

pardon by the Governor
for the reason that the
crime with which he or
she was charged was
either not committed at
all or, if committed, was
not committed by him or
her, or who, being

discharge, or pardon;
and at least 4 months
prior to the next
meeting of the
legislature. There is a
hearing on the claim.
Board recommends to
the legislature that

An award is limited
to $Ioo/day of
incarceration served
subsequent to
conviction.

222. I would like to thank Mr. Jared Hoskins, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of
Utah, Class of 2o08, for his help in the preparation of this Appendix.
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STATUTORY DEFINITION OF
"WRONGFUL CoNvICTION"

PROCEDURAL

REMEDIAL

LIMITATIONS

LIMITATIONS

California
(continued)

innocent of the crime with
which he or she was
charged for either of the
foregoing reasons, shall
have served the term or
any part there of for
which he or she was
imprisoned.

there be an
appropriation made to
the victim.

Districtof
Columbia

Any person unjustly
convicted of and
subsequently imprisoned
for a criminal offense
contained in the District
of Columbia.

STATE

D.C.

CODE

§§ 2-42I

(2006)

to -423

Any person bringing suit
under § 2-42i must allege
and prove:
(I) That his conviction
has been reversed or set
aside on the ground that
he is not guilty of the
offense of which he was
convicted, or on new trial
or rehearing was found
not guilty of such offense,
as appears from the
record or certificate of the
court setting aside or
reversing such conviction,
or that he has been
pardoned upon the stated
ground of innocence and
unjust conviction; and
That, based upon clear
and convincing evidence,
he did not commit any of
the acts charged or his acts
or omissions in connection
with such charge constituted no offense against
the United States or the
District of Columbia the
maximum penalty for
which would equal or
exceed the imprisonment
served and he did not, by
his misconduct, cause or
bring about his own
prosecution.
(2)

Upon a finding by
the judge of unjust
imprisonment in
accordance with the
standards set by § 2422 the judge may
award damages.
Punitive damages
may not be awarded.
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Illinois

Time unjustly served in

705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5o5/8
STAT.
(2006)

prisons of this State where
the persons imprisoned
shall receive a pardon
from the governor stating

PROCEDURAL
LIMITATIONS

The court shall make
no award in excess of
the following
amounts: for
imprisonment of five

that such pardon is issued
on the ground of
innocence of the crime for
which they were
imprisoned,

Iowa
IOWA CODE

§ 663A.I (2006)

(a) The individual was
charged, by indictment or
information, with the
commission of a public
offense classified as an
aggravated misdemeanor
or felony.
(b) The individual did not
plead guilty to the public
offense charged, or to any
lesser included offense,
but was convicted by the
court or by a jury of an
offense classified as an
aggravated misdemeanor
or felony.
(c) The individual was
sentenced to incarceration
for a term of
imprisonment not to
exceed two years if the
offense was an aggravated
misdemeanor or to an
indeterminate term of
years under chapter 902 if
the offense was a felony,
as a result of the
conviction.

REMEDIAL
LIMITATIONS

years or less, not
more than $I5,ooo;
for imprisonment of
fourteen years or
less but over five
years, not more than
$30,000; for
imprisonment of
over fourteen years,
not more than
$35,ooo; and
provided further, the
court shall fix
attorney's fees not to
exceed 25% of the
award granted.
Upon receipt of an
order vacating,
dismissing, or
reversing the
conviction and
sentence in a case for
which no further
proceedings can be or
will be held against an
individual on any facts
and circumstances
alleged in the
proceedings which
resulted in the
conviction, the district
court shall make a
determination
whether there is clear
and convincing
evidence to establish
either of the following
findings:
(a) That the offense for
which the individual
was convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned,
including any lesserincluded offenses, was
not committed by the
individual.

Damages
recoverable from the
state by a wrongfully
imprisoned person
under this section
are limited to the
following:
(a) The amount of
restitution for any
fine, surcharge, other
penalty, or court
costs imposed and
paid and any
reasonable
attorney's fees and
expenses incurred in
connection with all
criminal proceedings
and appeals
regarding the
wrongfully imposed
judgment and
sentence and such
fees and expenses
incurred in
connection with any
civil actions and
proceedings for
postconviction relief
which are related to
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Iowa (continued) (d) The individual's
conviction was vacated or
dismissed, or was
reversed, and no further
proceedings can be or will
be held against the
individual on any facts
and circumstances alleged
in the proceedings which
had resulted in the
conviction.
(e) The individual was
imprisoned solely on the
basis of the conviction
that was vacated,
dismissed, or reversed and
on which no further
proceedings can be or will
be had.

(b) That the offense
for which the
individual was
convicted, sentenced,
and imprisoned was
not committed by any
person, including the
individual.
If the district court
finds that there is
clear and convincing
evidence to support
either of the findings
set out above, the
district court shall do
all of the following:
(a) Enter an order
finding that the
individual is a
wrongfully
imprisoned
person.
(b) Orally inform the
person and the
person's attorney that
the person has a right
to commence a civil
action against the
state under chapter
669 on the basis of
wrongful
imprisonment.

the wrongfully
imposed judgment
and sentence.
(b) An amount of
liquidated damages
in an amount equal
to fifty dollars per
day of wrongful
imprisonment.
(c) The value of any
lost wages, salary, or
other earned income
which directly
resulted from the
individual's
conviction and
imprisonment, up to
twenty-five thousand
dollars per year.
(d) The value of
reasonable
attorney's fees for
services provided in
connection with an
action under this
section.

The state appeal
board or the court
shall not offset the
award by any
expenses incurred by
the state or any
(c) Within seven days political subdivision
of entry of the order
of the state in
finding that an
connection with the
individual is a
arrest, prosecution,
wrongfully
and imprisonment of
imprisoned person,
the individual,
the clerk of court shall including, but not
limited to, expenses
forward a copy of the
order, together with a for food, clothing,
copy of this section, to shelter, and medical
the individual named
care.
in the order.
Actions shall be
commenced within
two years of entry of
the district court
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order adjudging the
individual to be a
wrongfully
imprisoned person.

Iowa (continued)

Maine
ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14,
§ 8241 (2006)

(A) That the person was
convicted of a criminal
offense under the laws of
this State;
(B) That as a result of
that conviction, the
person was sentenced to a
period of incarceration
and was actually
incarcerated;
(C) That subsequent to
the conviction and as a
condition precedent to
suit, the person received a
full and free pardon
pursuant to the
Constitution of Maine,
Article V, Part First,
Section I I, which is
accompanied by a written
finding by the Governor
who grants the pardon
that the person is
innocent of the crime for
which that person was
convicted; and

A Governor's failure
to issue a written
finding that the
person is innocent of
the crime for which
the person was
convicted is final and
not subject to judicial
view.
Every claim for
wrongful
imprisonment
permitted under this
chapter is forever
barred from the
courts of this State
unless an action is
begun in the courts
within two years after
the date of the full
and free pardon of the
conviction on which
the claim is based.

In any action for
damages permitted
by this chapter, the
claim for and award
of damages,
including costs,
against the State
may not exceed
$300,000 for all
claims arising as a
result of a single
conviction.
A judgment or
award against the
State pursuant to
this chapter may not
include punitive or
exemplary damages.

(D) That the court finds
that the person is
innocent of the crime for
which the person was
convicted.
Maryland
MD. CODE ANN.,
MDAE
NN.
SAEF.
§

PROC. § O-5O
(West 2006)

An individual erroneously
convicted, sentenced, and
confined under State law
for a crime the individual
did not commit
dcollect

If an individual uses
any part of a grant
received under the
statute to pay for
services rendered to
the grant, that

The individual must have
received from the
Governor a full pardon
stating that the
individual's conviction has
been shown conclusively
to be in error.

part of the grant is
forfeited to the
State.
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Those that have been
granted a full pardon
pursuant to section 152 of
chapter 127, if the
governor expressly states
in writing his belief in the
individual's innocence, or
those who have been
granted judicial relief by a
state court of competent
jurisdiction, on grounds
which tend to establish
the innocence of the
individual as set forth in
clause (vi) of subsection
(C), and if:

Maximum of
$5oo,ooo, as well as
the potential for
physical and
emotional services,
educational services
at any state or
community college,
and expungement of
the record of
conviction.

(a) The judicial relief
vacates or reverses the
judgment of a felony
conviction, and the felony
indictment or complaint
used to charge the
individual with such felony
has been dismissed, or if a
new trial was ordered, the
individual was not retried
and the felony indictment
or complaint was dismissed
or a nolle prosequi was
entered, or if a new trial
was ordered the individual
was found not guilty at the
new trial; and
(b) At the time of the filing
of an action under this
chapter no criminal
proceeding is pending or
can be brought against the
individual by a district
attorney or the attorney
general for any act
associated with such felony
conviction.
Missouri

Mo. REV. STAT.
M RV. STAT,
§ 650.058 (2006)

Any individual who was
found guilty of a felony in
a Missouri court and later
determined to be actually

Eligible for $50 per
day of postconviction
confinement if filed

innocent of such crime
solely as a result of DNA
profiling analysis.

within one year of
release.
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Person whose judgment of
conviction was overturned
by a court based on the
results of postconviction
forensic DNA testing that

Provides educational
aid to wrongfully
convicted persons
exonerated through
post-conviction

exonerates the person of
the crime for which the
person was convicted.

DNA testing.

New Hampshire

Time unjustly served in

N.H.

the state prison when a
person is found to be
innocent of the crime for
which he was convicted.

Such a claim shall be
limited to an award
not to exceed

MN. COE
5
ANN. § 53-1-214
(2006)

REV. STAT,

ANN. §§

to

541-B:9

:14 (2006)

New Jersey
N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 52: 4C-1

(West 2006)

Innocent persons who
have been convicted of
crimes and subsequently
imprisoned, who can
demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that
they were mistakenly
convicted and imprisoned.
The person (hereinafter
titled, "the claimant")
shall establish the
following by clear and
convincing evidence:
(a) That he was convicted
of a crime and
subsequently sentenced to
a term of imprisonment,
served all or any part of
his sentence; and
(b) He did not commit the
crime for which he was
convicted; and
(c) He did not by his own
conduct cause or bring
about his conviction.

$20,000.

The court, in
exercising its
discretion as
permitted by law
regarding the weight
and admissibility of
evidence submitted
pursuant to this
section, may, in the
interest of justice, give
due consideration to
difficulties of proof
caused by the passage
of time, the death or
unavailability of
witnesses, the
destruction of
evidence or other
factors not caused by
such persons or those
acting on their behalf.
The suit, accompanied
by a statement of the
facts concerning the
claim for damages,
verified in the manner
provided for the
verification of
complaints in civil
actions, shall be
brought by the
claimant within a
period of two years
after his release from
imprisonment, or
after the grant of a

Damages awarded
under this act shall
not exceed twice the
amount of the
claimant's income in
the year prior to his
incarceration or
$20,000.00 for each
year of
incarceration,
whichever is greater.
In addition to the
damages awarded
pursuant to
subsection a., the
claimant shall be
entitled to receive
reasonable attorney
fees.
A person serving a
term of
imprisonment for a
crime other than a
crime of which the
person was
mistakenly convicted
shall not be eligible
to file a claim for
damages pursuant to
the provisions of this
act.
A person shall not
be eligible to file a
claim for damages
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New Jersey
(continued)

New York
N.Y. C.P.L.R.
8-b (McKinney
2006)

[VOL. 59:51 5

Innocent persons who
have been wrongly
convicted of crimes and
subsequently imprisoned.
Those innocent persons
who can demonstrate by
clear and convincing
evidence that they were
unjustly convicted and
imprisoned.
Any person convicted and
subsequently imprisoned
for one or more felonies
or misdemeanors against
the state which he did not
commit may, under the
conditions hereinafter
provided, present a claim
for damages against the
state.

pardon to him.

pursuant to the
provisions of this
act if the sentence
for the crime of
which the person
was mistakenly
convicted was
served concurrently
with the sentence
for the conviction
of another crime.

The court, in
exercising its
discretion as
permitted by law
regarding the weight
and admissibility of
evidence submitted
pursuant to this
section, shall, in the
interest of justice, give
due consideration to
difficulties of proof
caused by the passage
of time, the death or
unavailability of
witnesses, the
destruction of
evidence or other
factors not caused by
such persons or those
acting on their behalf.

Damages in such
sum of money as the
court determines will
fairly and reasonably
compensate him.

In order to obtain a
judgment in his favor,
claimant must prove
by clear and
convincing evidence
that:
(a) He has been
convicted of one or
more felonies or
misdemeanors against
the state and
subsequently
sentenced to a term of
imprisonment, and
has served all or any
part of the sentence;
and
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New York
(continued)

(b) (i) He has been
pardoned upon the
ground of innocence
of the crime or crimes
for which he was
sentenced and which
are the grounds for
the complaint; or (ii)
His judgment of
conviction was
reversed or vacated,
and the accusatory
instrument dismissed
or, if a new trial was
ordered, either he was
found not guilty at the
new trial or he was
not retried and the
accusatory instrument
dismissed; provided
that the judgment of
conviction was
reversed or vacated,
and the accusatory
instrument was
dismissed and;
(c) He did not commit
any of the acts
charged in the
accusatory instrument
or his acts or
omissions charged in
the accusatory
instrument did not
constitute a felony or
misdemeanor against
the state; and
(d) He did not by his
own conduct cause or
bring about his
conviction.

North Carolina
N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 148-82 (2006)

Any person who, having
been convicted of a felony
and having been
imprisoned in a State
prison, who was
thereafter or who shall
hereafter be granted a
pardon of innocence by
the Governor upon the

The petition must
presented within five
years of the granting
of the pardon.

The Industrial
Commission shall
award to the
claimant an amount
equal to $20,000 for
each year or the pro
rata amount for the
portion of each year
of the imprisonment

Such petition shall be
addressed to the
Industrial
Commission.
J

L
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(continued)

grounds that the crime
with which the person was
charged either was not
committed at all or was
not committed by that
person.

Ohio

(a) The individual was
charged with a violation
of a section of the Revised
Code by an indictment or
information prior to, or
on or after, September 24,
1986, and the violation
charged was an
aggravated felony or
felony.

OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2743.48

(West 2006)

(b) The individual was
found guilty of, but did
not plead guilty to, the
particular charge or a
lesser-included offense by
the court or jury involved,
and the offense of which
the individual was found
guilty was an aggravated
felony or felony.
(c) The individual was
sentenced to an indefinite
or definite term of
imprisonment in a state
correctional institution for
the offense of which the
individual was found
guilty.
(d) The individual's
conviction was vacated or
was dismissed, or reversed
on appeal, the prosecuting
attorney in the case
cannot or will not seek
any further appeal of right
or upon leave of court,
and no criminal
proceeding is pending,
can be brought, or will be
brought by any
prosecuting attorney, city

PROCEDURAL
LIMITATIONS
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actually served,
including any time
spent awaiting trial,
but in no event shall
the compensation
exceed a total
amount of $5oo,ooo.
The complainant may
establish that the
claimant is a
wrongfully
imprisoned individual
by submitting to the
court of claims a
certified copy of the
judgment entry of the
court of common
pleas associated with
the claimant's
conviction and
sentencing, and a
certified copy of the
entry of the
determination of a
court of common
pleas that the
claimant is a
wrongfully
imprisoned individual.

A wrongfully
imprisoned
individual is entitled
to receive a sum of
money that equals
the total of each of
the following
amounts:

(a) The amount of
any fine or court
costs imposed and
paid, and the
reasonable
attorney's fees and
other expenses
incurred by the
wrongfully
imprisoned
individual in
connection with all
associated criminal
proceedings and
appeals, and, if
No other evidence
applicable, in
shall be required of
connection with
the complainant to
obtaining the
establish that the
wrongfully
claimant is a
imprisoned
wrongfully
imprisoned individual, individual's
and the claimant shall discharge from
confinement in the
be irrebuttably
state correctional
presumed to be a
institution;
wrongfully
imprisoned individual.
(b) For each full year
of imprisonment in
the state correctional
institution for the
offense of which the
wrongfully
imprisoned
individual was found
guilty, forty
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Ohio (continued) director of law, village
solicitor, or other chief
legal officer of a
municipal corporation
against the individual for
any act associated with
that conviction.
(e) Subsequent to
sentencing and during or
subsequent to
imprisonment, an error in
procedure resulted in the
individual's release, or it
was determined by a court
of common pleas that the
offense of which the
individual was found
guilty, including all lesserincluded offenses, either
was not committed by the
individual or was not
committed by any person.

thousand three
hundred thirty
dollars or the
adjusted amount
determined by the
auditor of state
pursuant to section
2743.49 of the
Revised Code, split
and for each part of
a year of being so
imprisoned, a prorated share of forty
thousand three
hundred thirty
dollars or the
adjusted amount
determined by the
auditor of state
pursuant to section
2743.49 of the
Revised Code;
(c) Any loss of
wages, salary, or
other earned income
that directly resulted
from the wrongfully
imprisoned
individual's arrest,
prosecution,
conviction, and
wrongful
imprisonment;
(d) The amount of
the following cost
debts the
department of
rehabilitation and
correction recovered
from the wrongfully
imprisoned
individual who was
in custody of the
department or under
the department's
supervision:
(i) Any user fee or
copayment for
services at a
detention facility,
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including, but not
limited to, a fee or
copayment for sick
call visits;
(ii) The cost of
housing and feeding
the wrongfully
imprisoned
individual in a
detention facility;
(iii) The cost of
supervision of the
wrongfully
imprisoned
individual;
(iv) The cost of any
ancillary services
provided to the
wrongfully
imprisoned
individual.

Ohio (continued)

Reasonable attorney
fees incurred in
pursuing the
statutory claim are
also recoverable.
Additionally, to be
eligible to so
recover, the
wrongfully
imprisoned
individual shall
commence a civil
action under this
section in the court
of claims no later
than two years after
the date of the entry
of the determination
of a court of
common pleas that
the individual is a
wrongfully
imprisoned
individual.
Oklahoma

Wrongful criminal felony

A claimant shall not

STAT. tit.
OKLA.
,

conviction resulting
the in
impsonment,
claimant has received a

entitled to for any
be
compensation
part of a sentence in

5 1 § 154(B)(I
(2,06)

)

Shall not exceed
$175,ooo.oo.
No award for
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full pardon on the basis of
a written finding by the
Governor of actual
innocence for the crime
for which the claimant
was sentenced or has been
granted judicial relief
absolving the claimant of
guilt on the basis of actual
innocence of the crime for
which the claimant was
sentenced.

prison during which
the claimant was also
serving a concurrent
sentence for a crime
not covered by this
subsection.

The provisions of this
subsection shall apply
to convictions
occurring on or before
the effective date of
this act as well as
convictions occurring
For a claimant to recover
after the effective
based on "actual
innocence," the individual date of this act. If a
court of competent
must meet the following
jurisdiction finds that
criteria:
retroactive
application of this
(a) The individual was
charged, by indictment or subsection is
unconstitutional, the
information, with the
prospective
commission of a public
application of this
offense classified as a
subsection shall
felony,
remain valid.
(b) The individual did not
plead guilty to the offense
charged, or to any lesser
included offense, but was
convicted of the offense,
(c) The individual was
sentenced to incarceration
for a term of
imprisonment as a result
of the conviction,
d. the individual was
imprisoned solely on the
basis of the conviction for
the offense, and
in the case of a pardon, a
determination was made
by either the Pardon and
Parole Board or the
Governor that the offense
for which the individual
was convicted, sentenced
and imprisoned, including
any lesser offenses, was
not committed by the
individual, or in the case

damages in an action
or any claim against
the state or a
political subdivision
shall include
punitive or
exemplary damages.
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Oklahoma
(continued)

of judicial relief, a court
of competent jurisdiction
found by clear and
convincing evidence that
the offense for which the
individual was convicted,
sentenced and
imprisoned, including any
lesser included offenses,
was not committed by the
individual and issued an
order vacating, dismissing
or reversing the
conviction and sentence
and providing that no
further proceedings can
be or will be held against
the individual on any facts
and circumstances alleged
in the proceedings which
had resulted in the
conviction.

Tennessee

Persons wrongfully
imprisoned and granted
exoneration pursuant to
§ 40-27-109.

TENN. CODE
ANN.

(2006)

§ 9-8-1o8

Must be filed with the
board no later than
one (I) year from the
date that the claimant
is granted exoneration
pursuant to § 40-27Io9; and the state of
Tennessee shall have
a right of subrogation
as provided by law for
any amount awarded
pursuant to this
subdivision against
any person who
willfully and
intentionally
committed an act or
engaged in conduct
that directly resulted
in or contributed to
the wrongful
conviction and
imprisonment of the
claimant.
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Compensation
payable to such
persons shall be
determined by the
board considering all
factors the board
considers relevant
including, but not
limited to, the
person's physical
and mental suffering
and loss of earnings;
provided, however,
that the maximum
aggregate total of
such compensation
shall not exceed
$1 ,OO0,OOO.
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A person is entitled to
compensation if:
(i) The person has served
in whole or in part a
sentence in prison under
the laws of this state; and
The person:
(A) Has received a full
pardon on the basis of
innocence for the crime
for which the person was
sentenced; or
(B) Has been granted
relief on the basis of
actual innocence of the
crime for which the
person was sentenced.

Must seek
compensation not
later than the third
anniversary of the
date the person
received the pardon
or was found not
guilty.

(2)

Must either (I) file an
application with the
comptroller; or (2) file
suit against the state
for compensation.

A person is not
entitled to
compensation for
any part of a
sentence in prison
during which the
person was also
serving a concurrent
sentence for another
crime to which the
statute does not
apply.
One is entitled to
compensation in an
amount equal to:
(1)$25,000
multiplied by the
number of years
served in prison,
expressed as a
fraction to reflect
partial years, if the
time served is less
than twenty years; or
(2) $500,000 if the
time served is twenty
years or more.

Virginia
VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.o1-195.1o

(2006)

Incarceration for a felony
conviction for which the
conviction has been
vacated ,the person
incarcerated must have
entered a final plea of not
guilty, or regardless of the
plea, any person
sentenced to death, or
convicted of a Class I
felony, a Class 2 felony, or
any felony for which the
maximum penalty is
imprisonment for life, and
the person incarcerated
did not by any act or
omission on his part
intentionally contribute to
his conviction for the
felony for which he was
incarcerated.

90% of the Virginia

per capita personal
income for up to
twenty years plus a
tuition award worth
$io,ooo in the VA
community college
system.
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In order to present the
claim for unjust arrest,
imprisonment or
conviction and
imprisonment, claimant
must establish by
documentary evidence
that:
(i) He has been convicted
of one or more felonies or
misdemeanors against the
state and subsequently
sentenced to a term of
imprisonment, and has
served all or any part of
the sentence; and
He has been pardoned
upon the ground of
innocence of the crime or
crimes for which he was
sentenced and which are
the grounds for the
complaint; or
(2)

(3) His judgment of
conviction was reversed
or vacated, and the
accusatory instrument
dismissed or, if a new trial
was ordered, either he
was found not guilty at
the new trial or he was
not retried and the
accusatory instrument
dismissed; or
(4) The statute, or
application thereof, on
which the accusatory
instrument was based
violated the constitution
of the United States or
the state of West Virginia
The claim shall state facts
in sufficient detail to
permit the court to find
that claimant is likely to
succeed at trial in proving
that:

Any person claiming
compensation under
this section based on a
pardon that was
granted before the
effective date of this
section or the
dismissal of an
accusatory instrument
that occurred before
the effective date of
this section shall file
his claim within two
years after the
effective date of this
section.
Any person claiming
compensation under
this section based on a
pardon that was
granted on or after
the effective date of
this section or the
dismissal of an
accusatory instrument
that occurred on or
after the effective
date of this section
shall file his claim
within two years.
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LIMITATIONS

(I) In the case of an
unjust arrest or
imprisonment with a
warrant, information or
indictment which was
subsequently dismissed
that another person was
arrested or prosecuted
and convicted for the
same offense or offenses,
and

West Virginia
(continued)

In the case of an
unjust conviction and
imprisonment that he did
not commit any of the acts
charged in the accusatory
instrument or his acts or
omissions charged in the
accusatory instrument did
not constitute a felony or
misdemeanor against the
state, and
(2)

(3) He did not by his own
conduct cause or bring
about his conviction. The
claim shall be verified. If
the court finds after
reading the claim that
claimant is not likely to
succeed at trial, it shall
dismiss the claim, either
on its own motion or on
the motion of the state.
I

+

Wisconsin
WIS. STAT.

§ 775-05 (2006)

Any person who is
imprisoned as the result
of his or her conviction
for a crime in any court of
this state, of which crime
the person claims to be
innocent, and who is
released from
imprisonment for that
crime after March 13,
198o, may petition the
claims board for
compensation for such
imprisonment.

The claims board
shall find the amount
which will equitably
compensate the
petitioner, not to
exceed $25,ooo and
at a rate of
compensation not
greater than $5,000
per year for the
imprisonment.
Compensation
awarded by the
claims board shall
include any amount
to which the board

578

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

STATE
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(continued)

STATUTORY DEFINITION OF

PROCEDURAL
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LIMITATIONS
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REMEDIAL
LIMITATIONS

finds the petitioner is
entitled for attorney
fees, costs and
disbursements.
If the claims board
finds that the
amount it is able to
award is not an
adequate
compensation it shall
submit a report
specifying an amount
which it considers
adequate to the chief
clerk of each house
of the legislature, for
distribution to the
legislature.

